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WHO’S AFRAID OF 
PHILANTHROCAPITALISM? 
Garry W. Jenkins† 
This Article explores the concept of philanthrocapitalism—an 
emerging model for charitable giving intended to enhance the 
practice of philanthropy through the application of certain business 
techniques, particularly envisioned as being deftly carried out by a 
subset of ultra-rich, experienced business people. During the past 
fifteen years, but most strikingly in the past five, private foundations 
influenced by philanthrocapitalism and its forbearers have become 
increasingly directive, controlling, metric focused, and business 
oriented with respect to their interactions with grantee public 
charities in an attempt to demonstrate that the work of the 
foundations is “strategic” and “accountable.” Combining empirical 
analysis and theoretical critique, this Article challenges the 
prevailing wisdom that philanthrocapitalism offers a better, smarter 
philanthropy, thereby strengthening the entire nonprofit sector. In 
fact, after observing and documenting the tenets of and rhetoric 
associated with philanthrocapitalism, there is a serious risk that the 
shift to business-like, market-driven giving may change the nature of 
philanthropy in ways we will come to regret. Moreover, this Article 
links concerns about philanthrocapitalism to a broader disquiet about 
the blurring lines between the public and the private. I argue that 
nonprofit scholars and advocates should pay greater attention to this 
movement and what its “success” might mean for the social sector. 
                                                                                                        
† Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Associate Professor of Law, The Ohio State 
University Moritz College of Law. For helpful comments and suggestions, I thank Martha 
Chamallas, Amy Cohen, Deborah Merritt, Marc Spindelman, Donald Tobin, and the members 
of the Nonprofit Forum. Also thanks to Andrew Isaacs and Sarah Rives Horn for their research 
assistance. Finally, a special thanks to Dean Alan Michaels for his support. The title is used with 
apologies to playwright Edward Albee and his classic Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf?, a work 
about false illusion, whose title itself is a play on the Walt Disney song “Who’s Afraid of the 
Big Bad Wolf?” 
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INTRODUCTION 
Powerful grantmaking institutions profoundly influence much of 
civic life, in both the United States and abroad. Decisions made by 
foundation board members and staffs greatly affect millions of 
nonprofit organizations and the people they serve. Today the 
relationship between private foundations (philanthropic grantmaking 
entities) and public charities (grant-receiving nonprofit enterprises)1 is 
                                                                                                        
1 There are two types of organizations that qualify for recognition of federal income tax 
exemption under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code: private foundations and non-private 
foundations. See I.R.C. § 509 (2006). Entities primarily engaged in grantmaking and relying on 
their own principal fund, usually an endowment, are private foundations. Generally, 501(c)(3) 
organizations that are not private foundations have been colloquially referred to as “public 
charities” by lawyers. Most private foundations make grants to public charities, which tend to 
receive substantial support from the government, general public, and private foundations. These 
donor-reliant organizations often provide direct services or advocacy to fulfill their charitable 
mission. The term public charity, however, encompasses a broad set of modern nonprofit 
entities, including advocacy and civic organizations, arts and cultural organizations, colleges 
and universities, hospitals, religious organizations, among others. Therefore, this Article uses 
the term “public charities” or “charities” to refer to all organizations that are not private 
foundations under § 509(a). For more detail on the distinction between private foundations and 
public charities, see Carter G. Bishop, The Deontological Significance of Nonprofit Corporate 
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very much in flux. In particular, philanthrocapitalism—the 
application of business techniques to philanthropy by a new 
generation of self-made, hands-on donors—and strategic 
grantmaking, as new models of giving, have burst onto the scene, 
commandeering attention and potentially reshaping philanthropy.2 For 
the past decade, there have been growing calls for the nonprofit sector 
to consider new innovative approaches in conducting its work—
borrowed principally from the private sector—in order to improve 
capacity, efficiency, accountability, and effectiveness.3 At first these 
calls were primarily focused on the work of public charities. Lately, 
however, private foundations have become the target of those seeking 
to harness the power of “market-based” innovation, as a sort of new 
technology, to contribute to the project of smarter philanthropy. 
Further evidencing the concept’s prominence, a recent article 
included philanthrocapitalism among the ten most important 
philanthropy buzzwords and phrases of the past decade.4 
Led by billionaires and multimillionaires—armed with their keen 
business skills—philanthrocapitalism seeks to improve the practice of 
philanthropy through the application of techniques common to for-
profit businesses. Driven by a desire to bring hard-nosed strategy, 
performance metrics, and an emphasis on effectiveness to the 
nonprofit sector, a new guard of influential donors is changing the 
standards for what is considered effective philanthropy. Private 
foundations, grant-receiving public charities, nonprofit boards, and 
                                                                                                        
 
Governance Standards: A Fiduciary Duty of Care Without a Remedy, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 701, 
759–61 (2008). 
2 See, e.g., James Edward Harris, Level Five Philanthropy: Designing a Plan for 
Strategic, Effective, Efficient Giving, U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 19 (2003) (discussing the 
potential impact of strategic philanthropic giving); Dana Brakman Reiser, For-Profit 
Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2472 (2009) (noting the advent of 
philanthrocapitalism); The Birth of Philanthrocapitalism, ECONOMIST, Feb. 25, 2006, at 8 
(noting how the leading new philanthropists see themselves as social investors, and how the 
philanthropic infrastructure increasingly will resemble capitalism); Kristine Henry, An Expert 
on Philanthropy Takes Think-Tank Job, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, June 12, 2008, at 57 (quoting 
Jane Wales, vice president for philanthropy and society of the Aspen Institute, who stated that 
“[t]he question of applying private-sector metrics to social-change goals, what some people call 
‘philanthrocapitalism,’ is an area of a good deal of debate with the philanthropic community 
right now”); Christopher Quinn, Buy Coffee, Help a Village, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 23, 
2009, at D1 (noting that philanthrocapitalism is “a concept that is getting a lot of attention in the 
world of nonprofits”). 
3 See, e.g., Bill Bradley et al., The Nonprofit Sector’s $100 Billion Opportunity, HARV. 
BUS. REV., May 2003, at 94. 
4 See Lucy Bernholz, Editorial, ‘Impact Economy’: A Look Ahead and Back at a Decade 
of Nonprofit Buzzwords, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Jan. 13, 2011, at 44 (ranking 
“philanthrocapitalism” as the number-six buzzword). 
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the professionals who counsel and advise grantors and grantees are 
feeling the impact.  
The most prominent chroniclers of this movement are Matthew 
Bishop, the New York bureau chief of the Economist, and Michael 
Green, an economist. Their book, Philanthrocapitalism: How the 
Rich Can Save the World, is a rosy meditation on the future of 
American philanthropy that combines analysis, profiles, and 
anecdotes to reveal a new wave of charitable grantmaking with a new 
vocabulary and renewed strength.5 Bishop and Green applaud “[t]he 
new philanthropists” whom they believe are greatly improving a 
system they see as ineffective and in desperate need of reshaping.6 In 
their assessment, “The past couple of decades have been a golden age 
for capitalism, and today’s new philanthropists are trying to apply the 
secrets behind that money-making success to their giving.”7 
The appeal of philanthrocapitalism is easy to grasp. It is tempting 
to imagine society’s most pressing social ills being solved by a new 
breed of entrepreneurs-turned-philanthropists, who revolutionize 
grantmaking through the application of their business acumen, 
ambition, and “strategic” mindset. Traditionally, philanthropy has 
been cast as a welcome partner of government in addressing public 
needs.8 But, following the rise of neoliberalism as a dominant cultural 
and political ideology9 and the significant private wealth creation of 
the past twenty years,10 the social sector has looked to markets and 
business as sources of inspiration to improve the work of public 
charities.11 Thus we have a new wave of thought in philanthropy 
looking to imbue capitalist/business principles and market-based 
                                                                                                        
5 MATTHEW BISHOP & MICHAEL GREEN, PHILANTHROCAPITALISM: HOW THE RICH CAN 
SAVE THE WORLD (2008). 
6 Id. at 2. 
7 Id. at 2–3. 
8 See PETER FRUMKIN, STRATEGIC GIVING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF PHILANTHROPY 
30 (2006) (“One explanation for the tax code’s inclination to support giving is that government 
sees private philanthropy as a necessary partner in the pursuit of public purposes.”); Shelly 
Banjo, Is It Public, or Is It Private?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2009, at R5 (discussing increase in 
partnerships between government and philanthropic organizations). 
9 See DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2005); THE RISE OF 
NEOLIBERALISM AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (John L. Campbell & Ove K. Pederson eds., 
2001); Scott Burris et al., Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary Review of Current 
Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REV. 1, 46 (2008). 
10 See Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis, 99 
NW. U. L. REV. 1463, 1484 (2005) (“During the past fifty years, Americans have benefited from 
a dramatic increase in household net wealth. Moreover, this increase in wealth has accelerated 
dramatically during the past twenty years . . . .”); Jim Krane, More People Making Their First 
Million/Strong Global Economy Adds to Wealthy Rolls, HOUSTON CHRON., June 21, 2006, at 3 
(noting the rapid growth in the number of millionaires worldwide).  
11 See, e.g., J. Gregory Dees, Enterprising Nonprofits, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1998, 
at 54, 56. 
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theory into the work of not-for-profit, private foundations. Moreover, 
this past decade has seen academics and policymakers embrace “third 
way” solutions that blend public and private regulatory modalities.12 
In light of these converging trends, it is no surprise to find people 
enticed by an idea that promises to “save the world” through business 
thinking and market methods.  
The movement started with a small group of initial practitioners—
successful-entrepreneurs-turned-philanthropists—and expanded to 
include hundreds of foundations and advisory firms that have become 
its most forceful advocates.13 The principles of philanthrocapitalism 
have now captured the attention of journalists, foundation 
professionals, and trustees at “mainstream” foundations, 
governments, and beyond. Philanthropic institutions and even 
ordinary individuals are watching, mimicking this new development, 
and rapidly absorbing its messages all too well.14 This Article 
critiques the discourse of philanthrocapitalism and suggests that the 
rhetoric behind it has consequences.  
This Article proceeds from the premise that this emerging 
conception of what it means to practice “effective” philanthropy 
warrants examination because it has implications for how we think 
about the accountability and stewardship of tax-privileged resources 
managed by private individuals for the public benefit. Certainly, the 
additional philanthropic resources contributed by successful business 
                                                                                                        
12 See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY: THE RENEWAL OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
(1998); MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 
(2002); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547–49 
(2000); Michele Estrin Gilman, Poverty and Communitarianism: Toward A Community-Based 
Welfare System, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 721, 741 (2005) (noting President Clinton’s penchant for 
“Third Way” problem solving); Kathleen D. Hall, Science, Globalization, and Educational 
Governance: The Political Rationalities of the New Managerialism, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 153, 158–64 (2005) (describing the emergence of Third Way problem solving in the 
United States and Great Britain through the 1990s and 2000s); Lili Levi, The Four Eras of FCC 
Public Interest Regulation, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 854 n.157 (2008) (noting the profusion of 
“third way” literature during the last decade); Cass R. Sunstein, A New Progressivism, 17 STAN. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 197, 199–201 (2006) (discussing the “New Progressivism” and is relationship 
with the “Third Way”).  
13 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 220–77, 232–35. 
14 See infra text accompanying notes 63–67 (discussing philanthropic institutional 
responses); see also Kristi Heim, Got Cash to Spare? Starting Soon, Gates Foundation Will 
Accept It, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 1, 2006, at B1 (describing a seven-year-old girl inspired by 
Warren Buffett’s gift to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation who donated $35 of her own to 
the Foundation causing the Gates Foundation to adopt a new policy on accepting gifts); BILL & 
MELINDA GATES FOUND., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT: PROGRESS AND PRESSING NEEDS 21–22 
(2009) [hereinafter BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT] (reporting that the 
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation received more than $10 million in unsolicited donations from 
the general public, other than Gates and Buffett, in 2008 which was up from $1.6 million in 
2007); BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 2007, at 44–45 (2008) (reporting 
that several members of the general public made contributions). 
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entrepreneurs and investors are greatly needed and welcomed by 
recipients. But a giving model that exclusively subscribes to the 
notion that this particular subgroup, through their use of business 
methods, is always engaged in better, smarter, and more effective 
grantmaking has dangerous appeal. This Article identifies and focuses 
on the dangers. 
Because charitable giving is generally presumed to be beneficial, 
regardless of its form, philanthropy is often taken for granted and 
rarely subjected to intense scrutiny. Many people have the normative 
impulse to assume that as long as charitable activity is undertaken in a 
manner consistent with law, it must therefore advance the greater 
good. In addition, recipients are often so grateful for the funding that 
they may overlook other concerns. Furthermore, a common line of 
thinking that starts with a recognition that giving is an optional act 
(e.g., “it’s their money”), an understanding that resources could be 
used for private consumption rather than public benefit (e.g., “they 
don’t have to donate it”), and an appreciation for the expressive value 
of giving to shape solutions and society (e.g., “so they should be able 
to do what they want”) leads people to be hesitant to criticize or 
question the philanthropic system. But even within the domain of 
what is legal, there are many activities that we might rightfully be 
concerned about because of their influence on society and 
infringement on other important values. My concern with the new 
form of philanthropy is not about its end uses—i.e., where the 
charitable donation goes—but rather the new ways that 
philanthrocapitalism governs and constrains how the funding flows. 
While I strongly support the independence and limited role of the 
state to dictate matters of charity governance,15 the self-governance 
exercised by foundations should be subject to critical evaluation and 
reflection. Although I would not legally regulate these new forms of 
philanthropic giving, I would encourage robust conversation about 
best practices in light of what I see as its harmful effects.  
Its proponents have billed this new form of philanthropy as one 
that is more ambitious, more strategic, more global, and more results 
oriented, requiring higher levels of personal involvement by donors 
than more traditional approaches.16 Less often discussed in the 
literature, however, is the fact that although donors have always had a 
certain degree of disproportionate control in grantor-grantee 
                                                                                                        
15 For an excellent discussion of foundation independence, see Evelyn Brody & John 
Tyler, Respecting Foundation and Charity Autonomy: How Public Is Private Philanthropy?, 85 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 579–583 (2010). 
16 John A. Byrne, The New Face of Philanthropy, BUS. WK., Dec. 2, 2002, at 82, 83–84. 
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relationships, this new movement, with its use of cutting-edge 
language about strategy and effectiveness, exacerbates the divide and 
strains these relationships further. As a result, grantmakers influenced 
by this movement are becoming more paternalistic, leaning toward 
foundation-centered problem-solving models that disempower 
grantees and the communities they serve. And more and more 
grantmakers are remaking themselves in this troubling new image.  
As I see it, philanthrocapitalism is the Martha Stewart of 
philanthropy: haughty and self-important, but simultaneously 
charming with mass appeal. To be fair, the problem lies less with the 
idea’s overarching goals than with its specific claims. It is important 
to appreciate the broader context in which the debate over 
philanthrocapitalism takes place, one in which public and private 
boundaries, market and communitarian values, and new global 
governance structures are being renegotiated and reevaluated. 
Although philanthrocapitalists may raise important questions about 
grantmaking, there are significant drawbacks to embracing 
philanthrocapitalism as a new paragon for carrying out charitable 
giving. Many of the practices associated with the attitude and style of 
this new form of giving endanger some of the most essential benefits 
and values the nonprofit sector brings to society, namely the role of 
nonprofit institutions in social change, the promotion of democratic 
values, and the building of communities and social ties through 
empowerment and participation. The goal of this Article is to 
encourage readers to critically examine the philanthrocapitalism 
movement to determine whether its core principles are deserving of 
broad application. Toward that end, this Article breaks new ground in 
presenting significant empirical research and offering a critical 
perspective of a seemingly positive trend. 
With philanthropy on the brink of an evolutionary shift, the 
question of what type of giving model will predominate the more than 
$580 billion in foundation assets17 is especially important to the 
nonprofit sector. Nothing less than the heart and soul of philanthropy 
is at stake. It is essential for lawyers to understand this major dialogue 
in the charitable sector. Private foundations and public charities rely 
on attorneys for advice on a range of issues, and lawyers are well 
represented on nonprofit boards.18 Therefore, it is not enough for 
nonprofit lawyers to be just skilled technicians capable of crafting 
                                                                                                        
17 See STEVEN LAWRENCE & REINA MUKAI, FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GROWTH AND 
GIVING ESTIMATES: CURRENT OUTLOOK 2 (2010) [hereinafter FOUNDATION GROWTH AND 
GIVING 2010].  
18 See RICHARD P. CHAIT ET AL., GOVERNANCE AS LEADERSHIP: REFRAMING THE WORK 
OF NONPROFIT BOARDS 4 (2005). 
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grant agreements; they also need to understand this major shift in the 
way funders and grantees interact. Just like their for-profit 
counterparts, nonprofit clients need and want their lawyers to 
understand relevant industry trends and developments in order to 
provide high quality service and sophisticated advice.19 Lawyers must 
have a deeper understanding of these trends, the pressures, and 
cultural dynamics facing the organizations, and the potential costs and 
benefits to the nonprofit sector (the relevant “industry” in this case) as 
a whole. This is the case whether lawyers are representing 
grantmaking foundations or grant-receiving charities, in order to 
provide counsel with a practical wisdom and a sense of judgment 
(which often requires balancing what is legal with what is right).   
This Article traces the genealogy of the philanthrocapitalism 
project, analyzes data to contextualize the rapid growth of this 
movement and its ideals, and describes why its rise should be 
worrisome. Part I explains philanthrocapitalism and strategic 
philanthropy with a focus on the language and the key principles of 
the movement. This Part explores the new philanthropy and compares 
it to more traditional grantmaking practices. Part II undertakes 
important descriptive work, detailing and documenting the broad 
effect of this new philanthropic movement. It presents original 
empirical research to illustrate the ways in which some of the 
principles advanced by philanthrocapitalism are slowly being 
embraced by foundation boards and professionals and impacting the 
practice of philanthropy on the ground. Part III provides a normative 
argument that identifies the dangers of philanthrocapitalism. The 
discussion invokes important principles of effectiveness in social 
change, core democratic and charitable values, and civic participation 
at stake for the nonprofit sector. In addition, I explore how, ironically, 
philanthrocapitalism purports to extol the values and virtues of free-
market ideals, but instead may distort the behavior of private 
foundations in ways that lead them to employ a command-and-control 
approach to their work that is inconsistent with commonly held free-
market principles. In this sense, the movement may be in tension with 
its own ends. 
                                                                                                        
19 See David E. Van Zandt, Foundational Competencies: Innovation in Legal Education, 
61 RUTGERS L. REV. 1127, 1134 (2009) (“[T]he most successful lawyers—in firms and 
beyond—need to understand not only their clients’ legal challenges, but also the business, 
organizational, and strategic contexts in which they arise.”); David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? 
Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2067, 2088 (2010) (noting that research indicates that clients place “a high premium on finding 
lawyers who ‘understand their business’”). 
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To be clear, charitable giving should be admired and encouraged. 
This Article does not aim to criticize the creation of grantmaking 
foundations or to impugn the munificence of wealthy corporate 
executives and business investors, such as Bill Gates, Warren Buffett, 
and others mentioned herein. To the contrary, I praise the generosity 
of spirit displayed by all donors willing to share substantial private 
resources for the public good or to help those in need. Rather, the 
Article asserts that an idealized model of effectiveness, focused 
predominantly on applying the business techniques of self-made 
billionaires in order to determine where and how funds are allocated, 
is an impoverished model. In doing so, this Article hopes to 
contribute to a broader conversation about the role and mission of 
philanthropy and to place the discussion in a broader academic 
conversation about private ordering and social policy. 
I. UNDERSTANDING PHILANTHROCAPITALISM AND  
STRATEGIC GRANTMAKING 
Philanthrocapitalism has developed as a subcategory of social 
enterprise work, the term used to describe efforts to combine social 
goals with commercial business methods.20 Discussions of social 
enterprise have traditionally focused on the work of public charities 
and for-profit entities. Over the past decade, the concept of social 
enterprise or social entrepreneurship has aroused significant interest 
and attention in the charitable sector and in the scholarly literature.21  
Both social enterprise and social entrepreneurship, however, are 
diffuse concepts that have been used and defined in a myriad of ways. 
Social entrepreneurship is most often used in connection with public 
charities. It focuses either on the formation by public-minded “change 
agents” of a new organization or project with a compelling social 
mission or on the promotion by nonprofit organizations of innovative 
programs and initiatives intended to generate earned income through 
commercial revenue, user fees, etc.22 Social enterprise, usually used 
                                                                                                        
20 See James J. Fishman, Wrong Way Corrigan and Recent Developments in the Nonprofit 
Landscape: A Need for New Legal Approaches, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 567, 599–601 (2007); 
Reiser, supra note 2, at 2449–51.  
21 See, e.g., Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of 
How the Business Judgment Rule Protects a Board’s Decision to Engage in Social 
Entrepreneurship, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 633 (2007) (“Social entrepreneurship is 
significantly impacting traditional philanthropy as there is a growing push for charities to 
become more business-like in how they are operated.”). 
22 See Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of America’s 
Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2463–64 (2005) (providing examples of 
entrepreneurial charities); David E. Pozen, We Are All Entrepreneurs Now, 43 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 283, 294–300 (2008) (describing different definitions and uses of the term “social 
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in connection with for-profit corporations, focuses on ventures 
seeking “a double bottom line,” that is, the pursuit of both social 
impact and financial reward through the delivery of services or 
products.23 Interestingly, philanthrocapitalism has evolved from an 
effort to apply these same principles to the work of private 
foundations. The first-wave effort to apply a combination of business 
and social practices to philanthropy led to the advent of “venture 
philanthropy,” generally considered a form of engaged grantmaking 
loosely based on the practices of venture-capital investing.24 Professor 
Thomas Kelley, for example, refers to venture philanthropy as the 
“better-funded doppelganger of ‘social entrepreneurship.’”25 
Philanthrocapitalism appears to represent a second-wave, that is, a 
more advanced version of venture philanthropy. 
As the portmanteau implies, philanthrocapitalism is a heightened 
combination of philanthropy and capitalism. At its core, it describes 
an ambitious new movement of charitable giving promoted by ultra-
rich “social investors, not traditional donors,”26 using big-business 
strategies. Among the most prominent faces of philanthrocapitalism 
are Bill Gates27 (billionaire founder of Microsoft28), Pierre Omidyar29 
(billionaire founder of eBay30), and Eli Broad31 (billionaire founder of 
KB Home and SunAmerica, now a subsidiary of the American 
                                                                                                        
 
entrepreneur”); J. Gregory Dees, The Meaning of “Social Entrepreneurship,” CTR. FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF SOC. ENTREPRENEURSHIP (May 30, 2001), http://www.caseatduke.org 
/documents/dees_sedef.pdf (describing key elements of  social entrepreneurship).  
23 See Lisa M. Fairfax, Achieving the Double Bottom Line: A Framework for 
Corporations Seeking to Deliver Profits and Public Services, 9 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 199, 
200–01 (2004) (discussing double bottom line corporations). 
24 See Susan R. Jones, Promoting Social and Economic Justice Through Interdisciplinary 
Work in Transactional Law, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 249, 266 (2004) (describing social-
venture philanthropy as a venture-capital influence on charitable giving); Christine W. Letts et 
al., Virtuous Capital: What Foundations Can Learn from Venture Capitalists, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Mar.–Apr. 1997, at 36. 
25 Kelley, supra note 22, at 2464. 
26 BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 6. 
27 See id. at 51–81 (discussing the world’s largest charitable foundation, headed by Bill 
Gates); see also BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 14. 
28 See JAMES WALLACE & JIM ERICKSON, HARD DRIVE: BILL GATES AND THE MAKING 
OF THE MICROSOFT EMPIRE (1992); The Forbes 400: Top 10, FORBES, Oct. 6, 2008, at 46, 46. 
29 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 116–24, 134–37 (discussing Omidyar’s 
philanthropy); see also Omidyar Network Fund, Inc., I.R.S. Form 990-PF (2008), 
http://www.omidyar.com/sites/default/files/file/2008%20990-PF,%20Return%20of%20Private 
%20Foundation.pdf (reporting the assets and expenditures of the Omidyar Network Fund). 
30 See ADAM COHEN, THE PERFECT STORE: INSIDE EBAY (2002); The Forbes 400: Tech 
Titans, FORBES, Oct. 6, 2008, at 168, 172. 
31 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 138–41 (discussing Broad’s philanthropy); see 
also THE BROAD FOUNDS., 2008 FOUNDATION REPORT (2009). 
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International Group, Inc.32). As depicted by Bishop and Green, the 
new philanthrocapitalists “see a world full of big problems that they, 
and perhaps only they, can and must put right.”33 These are the kind 
of entrepreneurs who are used to large-scale success and now are 
seeking to apply that same approach to philanthropy. The concept 
encompasses more than just the marginal importation of sound, basic 
management principles and high levels of grantor engagement. 
Rather, the rhetoric of philanthrocapitalism emphasizes a complete 
remaking of philanthropic giving in the image of business, in part by 
appropriating business management values (e.g., data focused, results 
based, etc.). Philanthrocapitalism has also adopted a belief that 
business methods are superior and that experienced, private-sector 
business people to replicate corporate achievements in philanthropy.   
Bishop and Green describe the present period as a new “golden 
age”34 of foundation giving by an elite class of entrepreneurs. The 
authors describe the ways in which such giving and the publicity 
surrounding it are part of an emerging cultural zeitgeist.35 As a result, 
this form of giving—highly engaged grantmaking with a focus on 
bottom-line results—is gaining currency, popularity, and devotees. 
The charitable-giving style of Bill Gates and Warren Buffett has 
become part of a larger global trend, reinforced and supported by new 
institutions, such as the Clinton Global Initiative36 and the World 
Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland,37 where philanthrocapitalists 
gather and exchange notes. According to Bishop and Green, the shift 
in philanthropy has been striking: individual philanthropists and 
                                                                                                        
32 See The Forbes 400: Market Masters, FORBES, Oct. 6, 2008, at 246, 250 
33 BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 3 (emphasis added). 
34 Id. at 21. The authors also note studies that have demonstrated increased giving by the 
superrich and the addition of both new bequests coupled with endowment growth of established 
foundations, which have greatly increased the amount of giving by private foundations over the 
past fifteen years. See id. at 5–6. 
35 See id. at 6, 8–9 (describing new links between philanthropy and media as well as 
philanthropy and celebrity); see also Face Value: The Brand of Clinton, ECONOMIST, Sept. 22, 
2007, at 84 (“Clinton . . . espouse[s] a businesslike approach to giving money that is now 
fashionable among the new rich.”); Liz Hunt, A Lesson in Quietly Doing Good from God’s 
Postman, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 1, 2008, at 20 (noting that “philanthropy is 
fashionable again”); Sherri Begin Welch, Family Foundations on Rise; Creating a Legacy 
Among the Benefits, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS., Nov. 10, 2008, at 24 (quoting an advisor to 
wealthy families who stated that “people establish family foundations because they think it’s a 
trendy thing” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
36 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 214–18; see also Philip Rucker, On Eve of 
Philanthropy Forum, Clinton Worries About Economy, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2008, at A6 
(quoting a corporate executive who stated that the Clinton Global Initiative “creates the idea that 
you may be successful as a chief executive of your company . . . , but if you do not think of 
philanthropy as part of your job description, you are not cool, you are not good” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
37 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 175, 217.  
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corporations are “embracing the profit motive” and “catching the 
philanthrocapitalism bug . . . . This is very different from traditional 
corporate philanthropy, which has often been ineffective . . . .”38 
But just how is philanthrocapitalism new and different? After all, 
successful business figures of prior generations founded many of the 
largest and most established grantmaking foundations in the United 
States. In fact, the “mainstream” foundations that today’s 
philanthrocapitalists decry as traditional and ineffective were founded 
by the likes of Andrew Carnegie,39 John D. Rockefeller,40 and Will 
Kellogg.41 Michael Edwards, a former foundation executive who has 
written critically about this new movement, argues that  
philanthrocapitalists are drinking from a heady and seductive 
cocktail, one part ‘irrational exuberance’ that is characteristic 
of market thinking, two parts believing that success in 
business equips them to make a similar impact on social 
change, a dash or two of the excitement that accompanies any 
new solution, and an extra degree of fizz from the oxygen of 
publicity.42  
Upon close study, three central features of philanthrocapitalism 
emerge: (1) the application of business principles to grantmaking, 
(2) high engagement by the funder, and (3) the tendency of funders to 
seek leverage to expand their spheres of influence. First, a central 
feature of philanthrocapitalism (and a key aspect of what supposedly 
makes it new and “improved”) is the application of business thinking 
and strategy drawn directly from the funder’s personal experience and 
success in the private sector. Bishop and Green characterize the spirit 
of philanthrocapitalism as “successful entrepreneurs trying to solve 
big social problems because they believe they can, and because they 
feel they should. . . . [T]hey know how to fix problems, for that is 
what they do all day in business.”43 Ultimately, as the project spreads, 
                                                                                                        
38 Id. at 7. 
39 See HAROLD C. LIVESAY, ANDREW CARNEGIE AND THE RISE OF BIG BUSINESS 206 
(Mark C. Carnes ed., 3d ed. 2007) (summarizing Andrew Carnegie’s giving over the course of 
his life, including the establishment of the Carnegie Foundation); DAVID NASAW, ANDREW 
CARNEGIE (2006) (describing the life and work of Andrew Carnegie as a businessman and 
philanthropist). 
40 See RON CHERNOW, TITAN: THE LIFE OF JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, SR. 563–70 (2d ed. 
2004) (describing the establishment of the Rockefeller Foundation). 
41 See WALDEMAR A. NIELSEN, THE BIG FOUNDATIONS 111–14 (1972) (describing 
Kellogg’s creation and management of the Kellogg Foundation). 
42 Michael Edwards, “Philanthrocapitalism” and Its Limits, INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., 
Apr. 2008, at 22, 23–24. 
43 BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 30. Several prominent philanthrocapitalists have 
established private foundations with especially ambitious goals. For example, the Bill & 
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its proponents see a path to a better world, not just because of an 
increase in the amount of philanthropy, but also because of an 
increase in the quality of philanthropy practiced. Bishop and Green 
contend that “one key ingredient of philanthrocapitalism is the 
responsibility and willingness of economic winners to . . . apply to 
their giving the same talents, knowledge, and intellectual vigor that 
made them rich in the first place. Philanthrocapitalism is about being 
a businesslike giver.”44 The practitioners of philanthrocapitalism have 
developed a new, albeit familiar, language to convey their business-
oriented-giving approach. In their hands, “philanthropy is ‘strategic,’ 
‘market conscious,’ ‘impact oriented,’ [and] ‘knowledge based.’”45  
Furthermore, philanthrocapitalism embraces the use of business 
and market-based tools, techniques, and methods to address 
intractable social problems. Its practitioners talk of applying 
“business principles” to the charitable sector to “lift people out of 
poverty,”46 and of “apply[ing] the entrepreneurial principles we have 
brought to business to charity . . . [to] have a shot at having a really 
strong impact, to be able to transform the lives of children.”47 As part 
of its business-knows-best philosophy, the movement also seeks 
opportunities to harness the profit motive for social problems, when 
possible.48 
Second, the private foundations backed by philanthrocapitalists 
believe in a high engagement—oftentimes a directive—form of 
grantmaking. This engagement allows them to exercise substantial 
control over the manner and uses of their funding in a drive for 
measurable results.49 Drawing on a record of their own business 
                                                                                                        
 
Melinda Gates Foundation has sought to “find a vaccine that will prevent AIDS, . . . eradicate 
malaria, spark an agricultural revolution in Africa and ensure that every child in the United 
States has access to a quality education, among other things.” Stephanie Strom, Gates 
Foundation Head to Leave Longtime Post, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2008, at A18. More recently, 
Jeffrey Skoll, the first president of eBay and founder of the Skoll Foundation, also formed the 
Skoll Urgent Threats Fund to focus on dire global threats like water shortages, pandemics, and 
the Middle East conflict. Stephanie Strom, A New Foundation Is Taking Aim at Urgent Threats, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2009, at A18. 
44 BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 271. 
45 Id. at 6. 
46 Douglas McGray, Network Philanthropy: The Men Behind eBay Are Leading a High-
Tech Revolution That Is Turning Charitable Giving on Its Head, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2007, 
(Magazine), at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pierre Omidyar). 
47 Jamie Doward, Can a Friend of the Stars Save British Schools?, OBSERVER (London), 
May 29, 2005, at 13 (quoting Arpad Busson, a multi-millionaire hedge-fund executive, 
discussing education initiatives). 
48 BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 117. 
49 See, e.g., Louise Armitstead, Financier’s Pounds 460m Giveaway Fund Manager 
Makes Single Biggest Donation to Charity in UK, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), June 21, 2008, 
at 1 (describing “the ‘new philanthropists,’ the super-rich who are not only giving away a large 
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accomplishments, philanthrocapitalists are focused on results and the 
measurable impact of their giving. Although the foundations still 
work with and rely on nonprofit public charities to implement work 
on the ground, philanthrocapitalism encourages foundations to set the 
agenda.50 This hands-on approach to philanthropy is gaining 
adherents, and as Part II of this Article demonstrates, is impacting the 
manner in which philanthropy is conducted. 
The third signature element of philanthrocapitalism is that these 
powerful men51 use their influence and personal access to people and 
resources to further advance their philanthropic goals.52 
Philanthrocapitalists refer to this as “achiev[ing] leverage.”53 For the 
philanthrocapitalists, it is not enough to use their own charitable 
giving to direct the pursuit of philanthropic solutions. They also seek 
to bring governments, businesses, and other funders to embrace and 
support their particular vision and their proposed solutions. Bishop 
and Green highlight the importance of leverage: 
[E]very philanthrocapitalist talks about the importance of 
leverage, and rightly so. . . . The high hopes for 
philanthrocapitalism are based on the belief that the wealthy 
can be hyperagents, able to achieve impact far greater than 
their relative financial resources would suggest by targeting 
their dollars . . . [and entering into] [p]artnership[s] with 
government, business, or NGOs . . . .54 
Accordingly, super-philanthropists also may use their high-profile 
giving and “convening power” to form and strengthen a variety of 
linkages and relationships: connections with celebrity partners,55 
                                                                                                        
 
proportion of their wealth but increasingly controlling the charities too”); Daniel Golden, 
Teachers’ Pest, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, July 19, 2010, at 58, 60 (quoting University of 
Michigan professor Maris Vinovskis who noted that historic benefactors “were not as 
prescriptive about how they wanted their money spent” as the new philanthropic billionaires like 
Gates, Broad, and others (internal quotation marks omitted)); Jennifer Steinhauer, Wielding Iron 
Checkbook to Shape Cultural Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2010, at C1 (describing Eli 
Broad as “[a] billionaire philanthropist whose beneficence comes with not just strings but with 
ropes that could moor an ocean liner”). 
50 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 52, 57–59 (noting that Gates, “the ultimate 
philanthrocapitalist,” takes an approach in which “the foundation sets policy” on the issues it 
funds).  
51 I note that virtually all the examples noted by Bishop and Green are men, with the 
notable exception of celebrity-philanthropists, referred to as “celanthropists,” Angelina Jolie and 
Oprah Winfrey. Id. at 197–98. 
52 Id. at 274. 
53 Id. at 275. 
54 Id. at 274. 
55 See, e.g., id. at 204 (quoting Patty Stonesifer, the former CEO of the Bill & Melinda 
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contacts with current and former world leaders and public officials,56 
and interactions with fellow titans of industry.57 Philanthrocapitalists 
view leveraging their personal networks of contacts as the key to 
success and believe that it is even more important than the money 
they give.58  
While the notion that these networks will be put to public uses 
may be admirable, the idea that well-practiced philanthropy requires a 
powerful Rolodex is troubling. Part of the freedom 
philanthrocapitalists have to exercise their power and influence comes 
not just from the access to powerful figures, but also from their sense 
of independence, a notion that one is virtually unaccountable and 
unbound, so long as one abides by the law. This freedom is part and 
parcel of the privilege of being superwealthy. Even Bishop and Green 
acknowledge that “[a]s hyperagents, the superrich can do things to 
help solve the world’s problems that the traditional power elites in 
and around government cannot. They are free from the usual 
pressures that bear down on politicians and activists and company 
bosses with shareholders to please.”59 Thus, these particular tax-
privileged foundations, usually heavily dominated by a single, 
individual founder, operate without significant accountability to the 
public. As explained in Part III.B.1, this can result in an active and 
aggressive form of philanthropy, which may undermine democratic 
values. 
At bottom, philanthrocapitalism is about more than just the 
celebration of charitable giving by the wealthy. Rather, 
philanthrocapitalism touts a new, more active and assertive style of 
giving, driven by a business-like giver bringing his own insight and 
direction, vision and solutions, as well as power and access to 
produce social change. It is nothing short of an effort to remodel the 
prevailing philanthropic patterns by supplying a new language, a new 
mindset, and new techniques for addressing social problems. In the 
words of Steve Case, the billionaire-turned-philanthropist who 
                                                                                                        
 
Gates Foundation who stated that “[o]ne of [the Foundation’s] most important partners is Bono 
[the lead singer of the prominent rock band U2]” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
56 See, e.g., id. at 214–15. 
57 See Ian Wilhelm, Secret Meeting of the Super-Philanthropists, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, 
June 4, 2009, at 34 (describing a private meeting of a dozen billionaires in early May 2009). 
58 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 227 (“In the for-profit world, networking is hot, 
online and off-line. Increasingly, the same is true in philanthropy, as some 
philanthrocapitalists—Bill Clinton first among them—even believe they can have a greater 
impact by leveraging their personal networks of contacts for good than by the money they 
give.”). 
59 Id. at 255. 
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cofounded Internet-services company America Online, Inc. (AOL),60 
the movement is designed to “unleash a new entrepreneurial, 
collaborative kind of philanthropy . . . [to] create new patterns that 
will help reshape the entire system.”61  
The calls for a more “strategic” approach to giving have already 
advanced several trends in philanthropy, affecting the entire 
philanthropic sector, including traditional philanthropy. Established 
grantmaking organizations are adopting these concepts and practices 
and suffusing them into their own procedures and activities. Private 
foundations of all sizes and origins are trying to prove that they are 
just as “smart,” “strategic,” and “effective” as this new breed of 
philanthropists.62 Beyond the fortunes of Gates and Buffett, 
traditional foundation managers are applying the methods of 
philanthrocapitalism to “reinvigorate the giving away of fortunes 
made by long-dead tycoons.”63  
Interestingly, the appropriation of the philanthrocapitalism model 
by more traditional grantmakers—such as corporate funders, family-
run foundations, and more established independent foundations—
transforms the phenomenon into something a bit different in the 
hands of these users. Lacking the self-made business experience, each 
funder has defined the contours of what strategic giving means 
somewhat differently. Like philanthrocapitalism, however, these 
approaches are still intensely focused on impact, high levels of 
engagement, and measurement. Generally speaking, advocates of 
strategic philanthropy believe in top-down strategies—“the power of 
ideas, persuasively communicated, to influence policy and compel 
action”64—as the most effective way to allocate scarce philanthropic 
dollars. As characterized by one independent foundation in the field, 
many funders are “‘proactive,’ with its practitioners taking the 
initiative to craft innovative solutions to significant problems and 
engaging in hard-nosed efforts to measure real outcomes.”65 The 
strategic approaches can be contrasted with traditional philanthropy, 
which frequently contains an express preference for a “responsive” 
                                                                                                        
60 See Hillary Prey, Poor Billionaires, FORBES, Oct. 6, 2008, at 34 (noting Stephen Case 
among the list of U.S. billionaires). 
61 BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 227. 
62 See JOEL L. FLEISHMAN, THE FOUNDATION: A GREAT AMERICAN SECRET 279 (2007) 
(noting that trustees have and will continue to push long-established foundations to adopt 
methods and practices of philanthrocapitalism). 
63 BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 151. 
64 TOM DAVID, THE CAL. WELLNESS FOUND., REFLECTIONS ON STRATEGIC 
GRANTMAKING 3 (2000), available at http://www.calwellness.org/assets/docs/reflections 
/nov2000.pdf. 
65 Id. 
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model of grantmaking based on bottom-up strategies emphasizing 
“the power of investment in institutional capacity and individual 
leadership at the local level”66 to achieve impact. 
In this Article, I refer to the more assertive, donor-centric approach 
to philanthropy as “muscular philanthropy.” Although money is still 
usually directed to various grant-seeking public charities to carry out 
charitable work, as in traditional philanthropy, private foundation 
grantors operating under this new philanthropy exert their power not 
just through their dollars but also through an unspoken sense that they 
know best. They assume that smart giving requires a foundation-led 
plan of attack on any given problem. It places the foundation at the 
center of the social problem-solving endeavor, relegating grantees to 
the role of subcontractors expected to execute the grand vision of the 
private foundation funder. In contrast, the prevailing conception 
attached to traditional (less muscular) incarnations of philanthropy, 
with their emphasis on building civil society, has been that of a 
coequal partnership, a relationship sometimes successfully achieved 
and other times less so. An apt metaphor for the philanthrocapitalism 
model would be the manager-subordinate corporate relationship.67 
This relationship threatens to turn grant-seeking charities into 
constrained participants without full recognition of their value, 
autonomy, and expertise.  
The choice between the competing relationship frameworks has 
consequences for “on the ground” operations. Here is what a large 
corporate foundation68 wrote in a document explaining strategic 
philanthropy and its view of the relationship between grantors and 
grantees: 
Donors today have come to expect—and in many cases, 
require—that their nonprofit partners not only show the 
ability to get the job done, but that they can deliver on their 
promises by achieving measurable results. This disciplined 
approach can lead to more effective philanthropy . . . . In 
certain ways this is a sea change. . . . Increasingly, donors are 
now committed to having a real impact in shorter time 
periods, and applying fresh thinking and tactics to problems 
                                                                                                        
66 Id. 
67 Of course I acknowledge that historic relations between foundations and the grant-
seeking charities have always faced challenges. Accordingly, I do not wish to exaggerate the 
“good old days” or present a Pollyanna-ish account of charitable giving before 
philanthrocapitalism came along, but I do wish to draw attention to how these different mindsets 
affect the influence and voice of nonprofit organizations. 
68 For the sake of full disclosure, I must note that I served as the foundation’s chief 
operating officer and general counsel earlier in my career.  
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that have eluded conventional approaches. As they take on 
the role of change-agents many donors today regard 
demonstrable accomplishment as key to their success.69 
This passage reveals that many funders in the field have so altered 
expectations and behaviors that the foundation community now 
recognizes something of a “sea change” in the charitable sector, 
acknowledgement that this trend is widely felt. It also reveals that for 
some funders, being “disciplined” and “effective” has become 
synonymous with holding the grant-receiving charity’s proverbial feet 
to the fire, as funders make their expectations explicit and require 
delivery of the goods within shorter time frames. Additionally, to 
prove their own success, funders see their job as holding grant 
recipients accountable to them. Most important, in this version of 
strategic philanthropy, it is the donor—not the nonprofit partner in the 
field or the constituencies it serves—that takes on the role of the 
change-agent and contributes the heralded “fresh thinking and 
tactics.”70 The point for now is that, if donors are not careful, this 
instrumentalization of charitable organizations to further the 
foundation’s goals can reinforce relational hierarchies and 
paternalism, placing the voice and expertise of operating nonprofits in 
the background, and leaving those closest to the problems on the 
ground disempowered.  
I do not mean to imply that philanthrocapitalists and other donors 
using strategic methods do not value the contributions of the 
nonprofit organizations they support. They do. That same corporate 
primer on strategic philanthropy cited earlier goes on to state, 
“Through strategic philanthropy, the Foundation seeks to promote 
effectiveness of the organizations it supports. . . . Our success is 
derived from the passion, energy, and intellect of the Foundation’s 
Board and staff and those of the organizations we support.”71 The 
important question, however, is: To what extent are the supported 
nonprofits treated as equal partners? Are they valued as resources and 
issue experts, freely contributing their best ideas? Or are they merely 
seen as excellent subcontractors executing the foundation’s vision? 
Philanthrocapitalist rhetoric suggests that foundations should consider 
grant-receiving nonprofits as merely passionate implementers, and 
                                                                                                        
69 THE GOLDMAN SACHS FOUND., MAXIMIZING IMPACT: A PRIMER ON STRATEGIC 
PHILANTHROPY 1, available at http://wwwqa2.goldmansachs.com/citizenship/philanthropy/pub 
lications-and-resources/other-publications/maximizing-impact-primer-on-strategic-philanthropy 
.pdf (last visited Jan 10, 2011). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 20 
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encourage them to leave the high-level problem solving and direction 
setting to the foundation; this vision, however, opens the new 
philanthropy to long-standing left-leaning criticisms of philanthropy 
that depict it as a tool of the powerful used to control the 
disenfranchised and entrench powerful interests.72 
The philanthrocapitalism movement and the broader reinvention of 
the institution of philanthropy have implications for lawyering and 
governance. These shifts in grantmaking practices are in response to a 
variety of pressures and criticisms of traditional philanthropy. Thus, 
philanthrocapitalism and strategic philanthropy have roots—even if 
not exclusively so—in calls for accountability.73 The appeal of 
philanthrocapitalism has been driven by questions about the 
legitimacy of perpetual private foundations in a democratic society, 
by calls that private foundations demonstrate their added value, and 
by demands that they use the tax-privileged dollars under their control 
effectively and wisely. So far the dialogue about philanthrocapitalism 
has been fairly muted, perhaps because “nobody wants to bite the 
hand that feeds them or seem out of step with the latest fashions of 
the funders.”74 Yet all people should be concerned—including 
lawyers who populate foundation board rooms and counsel wealthy 
individuals in establishing grantmaking foundations.  
II. TRENDS IN FOUNDATION GIVING  
Although still relatively new, the principles embodied by 
philanthrocapitalism and strategic grantmaking are beginning to 
infiltrate deep within the charitable-giving sector. One report on 
                                                                                                        
72 See Alice Gresham Bullock, Taxes, Social Policy and Philanthropy: The Untapped 
Potential of Middle- and Low-Income Generosity, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 325, 343–45 
(1997) (describing philanthropic giving as a means to perpetuate the interests and concerns of 
the wealthy); Rob Reich, Philanthropy and Its Uneasy Relation to Equality, in TAKING 
PHILANTHROPY SERIOUSLY: BEYOND NOBLE INTENTIONS TO RESPONSIBLE GIVING 27, 30 
(William Damon & Susan Verducci eds., 2006) (“Left-wing critics, especially those of a 
Gramscian bent, have long suggested that philanthropy is but another self-interested way for the 
powerful to continue their dominion over the poor and entrench the ideological interests of the 
wealthy in all of society.”). 
73 See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure 
Comprehensive Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 205, 272 (2004) (noting that 
private foundations represent the “segment of the nonprofit sector [that] is often singled out as 
most prone to accountability failures”); Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Philanthropy’s 
New Agenda: Creating Value, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1999, at 121 (questioning 
“[w]hether foundations are fulfilling their potential”); Jon Christensen, Exploring New Ideas for 
Making Finances Clearer and Scandals Rarer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2003, at F16 
(“Everywhere you turn in the world of philanthropy and nonprofits these days, people are 
talking about accountability.”).  
74 MICHAEL EDWARDS, SMALL CHANGE: WHY BUSINESS WON’T SAVE THE WORLD, at 
viii (2010). 
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strategic philanthropy noted the following two “typical comments” 
from a series of conversations with nonprofit agency leaders: 
“Funders are not open to genuine dialogue and tend to 
discount what we know. Program officers are more interested 
in giving us advice than in listening to us.” 
“Top-down, foundation-driven initiatives are tying up more 
and more dollars, cutting down the pool of funds available for 
unsolicited ideas and grants.”75 
To determine whether these complaints are widespread enough to 
reflect significant shifts, I analyzed a series of recent trends in 
foundation giving. My analysis identifies three trends that indicate the 
growing influence of philanthrocapitalism and the type of muscular 
philanthropy lamented by many nonprofit agency directors. First, 
foundations are concentrating their grantmaking76 by devoting 
proportionally more resources to larger and larger projects. Second, 
they are asserting more control over the use of the grant funds they 
disperse through the use of limited-purpose grants.77 Third, they are 
becoming increasingly closed to the ideas and innovations proposed 
by nonprofit organizations operating on the ground, working directly 
on the critical social issues.78 Although no single trend confirms the 
ascendency of philanthrocapitalism, taken together they demonstrate 
that private foundations in general are moving toward practices that 
allow them to exercise greater, rather than less, control over nonprofit 
activity. These trends are consistent with and indicative of the broader 
shift toward muscular philanthropy, in which foundations 
increasingly treat grantees more like contractors than partners.  
I do not mean to suggest that general operating support is always 
preferable to program support, that small grants are somehow better 
than large grants, or that foundations should never approach potential 
grant recipients with project ideas. Each of these practices (large 
grants, program support, proposal invitations) has value and may be 
appropriately used by grantmakers under certain circumstances. 
These data, however, present a larger picture of the trends in 
grantmaking and uncover shifts in the power dynamics between 
private foundations and grant-seeking nonprofit organizations and 
raise questions about how these new arrangements will affect public 
charities and the people they serve. 
                                                                                                        
75 DAVID, supra note 64, at 2. 
76 See infra Figures 1–2 and Table 1. 
77 See infra Figures 3–4. 
78 See infra Figures 5–6. 
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A. Increased Concentration of Large Grants 
Over the past decade or so, private foundations have tended to 
concentrate their grants by awarding more funding to the selected 
recipients. Specifically, the Foundation Center, which tracks the 
giving of more than 1000 large foundations each year,79 reports a 
substantial increase in the number of exceptionally large grants. 
Figure 1 shows that the raw number of grants of $5 million or more in 
their sample study increased by 572% between 1997 and 2008. 
During that same period, the raw number of $10 million-or-more 
grants saw a 919% increase.80 Although grantmaking grew during this 
period, Table 1 demonstrates that the increase was not nearly as 
sharp; the raw number of all grants increased by just 90.7% and the 
total dollar value of all grants increased by 218%.81  
The data from the sample funders also demonstrates that the 
combined dollar value allocation to these megagrants increased by 
862% from 1997 to 2008.82 As indicated above, during this same 
period, the total dollar value of all grants increased by only 218%.83 
As a consequence of this move to exceptionally large grants, the 
percentage of total grant dollars allotted to megagrants has increased 
as well. Figure 2 demonstrates this trend. In 1997, grants of $5 
million or more constituted only 9.9% of total grant dollars in the 
sample; by 2008, that percentage had risen to 29.9%.84 In other 
words, for every $1 in grantmaking activity by the largest foundations 
in the U.S. approximately 10 cents went to megagrants in the late 
                                                                                                        
79 The Foundation Center’s annual study is based on a sample of large foundations. For 
example, the 2008 sampling base included more than 800 of the 1000 largest foundations and 
the fifteen largest foundations in nearly every state, ranked by total grant giving and a sampling 
of other foundations. Consequently, the sample is not a “stratified random sample” of the 
nation’s full foundation community. In addition, the composition of the set varies from year to 
year. See STEVEN LAWRENCE & REINA MUKAI, FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: 
UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 39–40 (2010) [hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 
2010]. As a result, the data “should be interpreted as suggestive of grantmaking trends across the 
United States—especially among larger foundations—but not conclusive.” See id. at 40. Yet the 
Foundation Center’s figures still offer important data to study general trends in foundation 
giving.  
80 See Figure 1. Without fuller data from the Foundation Center’s annual samples, which 
are unpublished, I am not able to conduct more sophisticated measures of concentration. 
81 See Table 1. 
82 Grants of $5 million or more in 1997 totaled more than $785 million. See LOREN RENZ 
ET AL., FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING: YEARBOOK OF FACTS AND FIGURES ON PRIVATE, 
CORPORATE, AND COMMUNITY FOUNDATIONS 78 (1999) [hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING 
YEARBOOK 1999]. In 2008, grants of $5 million or more totaled more than $7.55 billion. See 
FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2010, supra note 79, at 2. 
83 See Table 1. 
84 See Figure 2. 
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1990s and by the late 2000s nearly thirty cents of each dollar is 
allocated to the very largest grants.   
Although these data reflect a healthy growth in private foundations 
and U.S. grantmaking in general, the focus should be on the much 
more dramatic growth of large grants, which reflects a change in 
giving practices in the philanthropic sector. This growth in the 
number and value of megagrants, when compared to the substantially 
slower growth of the total number and value of all grants, tells us that 
grantmakers are directing relatively more resources to larger projects, 
perhaps at the expense of other worthwhile but smaller projects. The 
overall growth in foundation giving over the past decade or so, fueled 
by a booming stock market and the creation of new foundations,85 
masks the fact that proportionally, the number of grants has not kept 
apace with the growth in dollars given or the proliferation of 
exceptionally large grants. 
Furthermore, Figure 1 shows that in just the past few years the 
number of grants of $10 million or more has increased greatly. It 
increased by 20.5% between 2006 and 2007, and another 13.8% 
between 2007 and 2008.86 This contrasts with the much slower 
growth in the number of all grants: 7.0% and 8.3% for those same two 
time periods, respectively.87  
In terms of the total dollar value of these very large grants, the 
Foundation Center reports that in 2008 the total value of the $10 
million-or more-grants from sampled funders reached a record of $5.5 
billion,88 a 34% increase from the prior year.89 By comparison, the 
total value of all grants increased a more modest 16.7% over that 
time.90 And in particular, grants under $50,000 increased only 11% to 
$2 billion.91 This direct comparison of large-dollar grants and small-
dollar grants indicates an increased concentration in large grants. 
 
                                                                                                        
85 See FOUNDATION GROWTH AND GIVING 2010, supra note 17, at 4 (noting that the 
number of U.S. grantmaking foundations has increased steadily since the early 1980s and more 
sharply during the economic boom years of the late 1990s). 
86 See Figure 1. 
87 See Table 1. 
88 FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2010, supra note 79, at 1. 
89 STEVEN LAWRENCE ET AL., FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON 
FUNDING PRIORITIES 1 (2009) [hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2009] (reporting $4.1 
billion to grants of $10 million or more). 
90 See Table 1. 
91 FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2009, supra note 89, at 1 [hereinafter FOUNDATION 
GIVING TRENDS 2009]; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2010, supra note 79, at 1. 
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Figure 1. Change in Number of Larger Grants Awarded, 1997 to 200892 
 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of Total Dollars Allocated to Grants of $5 Million or More, 
1997 to 200893 
 
                                                                                                        
92 This chart is reprinted from data presented in FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2009, 
supra note 89, at 1 and FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2010, supra note 79, at 1. 
93 These data are drawn from the following sources. FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2010, 
supra note 79, at 2. FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2009, supra note 89, at 2; JOSEFINA ATIENZA 
& REINA MUKAI, FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING 
PRIORITIES 1 (2008) [hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2008]; JOSEFINA ATIENZA ET 
AL., FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 1 (2007) 
[hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2007]; JOSEFINA ATIENZA & ASHLEY BAILEY, 
FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 1 (2006) 
[hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2006]; JOSEFINA ATIENZA & JENNIE ALTMAN, 
FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 2 (2005) 
[hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2005]; JOSEFINA ATIENZA & LESLIE MARINO, 
FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 2 (2004) 
[hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2004]; JOSEFINA ATIENZA & LESLIE MARINO, 
FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 2 (2003) 
[hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2003]; STEVEN LAWRENCE & DIA GANGULY, 
FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 2 (2002) 
[hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2002]; STEVEN LAWRENCE ET AL., FOUND. CTR., 
FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 2 (2001) [hereinafter 
FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2001]; STEVEN LAWRENCE ET AL., FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION 
GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 2 (2000) [hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING 
TRENDS 2000]; FOUNDATION GIVING YEARBOOK 1999, supra note 82, at 78. 
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Table 1. Distribution of Total Sampled Grants in Dollars and Number,  
1997 to 200894 
 
B. Growth of Limited-Purpose Grants 
Driven largely by a determination to prove impact from their 
grantmaking, many grantmakers are increasingly making limited-
purpose grants to narrowly circumscribed projects. These “program 
support” grants restrict the uses of money to a greater degree than 
“general support” grants, which nonprofits may use at their discretion 
for a variety of purposes. A 2007 study of America’s wealthiest 
foundations indicated that foundation management felt greater 
pressure from trustees and others to measure the effectiveness of their 
grantmaking. These pressures led them to favor restricted giving 
because proving effectiveness is more difficult with unrestricted 
giving.95 In addition, program-support grants allows foundations to 
exert control over donees by dictating the purposes for which funding 
may be used. Many donors restrict their giving to specific uses to 
                                                                                                        
94 These data are drawn from the following sources. FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2010, 
supra note 79, at 36; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2009, supra note 89, at 36; FOUNDATION 
GIVING TRENDS 2008, supra note 93, at 57; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2007, supra note 93, 
at 68; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2006, supra note 93, at 72; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 
2005, supra note 93, at 57; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2004, supra note 93, at 58; 
FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2003, supra note 93, at 63; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2002, 
supra note 93, at 64; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2001, supra note 93, at 54; FOUNDATION 
GIVING TRENDS 2000, supra note 93, at 50; FOUNDATION GIVING YEARBOOK 1999, supra note 
82, at 114. 
95 JUDY HUANG ET AL., CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PHILANTHROPY, IN SEARCH OF IMPACT: 
PRACTICES AND PERCEPTIONS IN FOUNDATIONS’ PROVISION OF PROGRAM AND OPERATING 
GRANTS TO NONPROFITS 8–9 (2006), available at http://www.effectivephilanthropy.org/assets 
/pdfs/CEP_InSearchOfImpact.pdf. 
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ensure greater accountability and to attempt to prove a grant’s 
impact.96 My analysis of the giving patterns of the past several years 
indicates that large private foundations are increasingly favoring more 
restrictive funding over unrestricted general operating support.  
The reported data compares the percentage of overall giving 
allocated to general support and program support in a given year from 
the total overall distribution of grants. It does not address changes on 
an absolute dollar basis. On an absolute dollar basis, both general and 
program support are on the rise because of the growing number of 
grantmaking foundations. Examining the data on a proportional basis 
does, however, provide information on relative growth or 
contraction—which reflects the shifts in overall funder preferences.  
 
Figure 3. Distribution of General Support Grants as a Percentage of Total 
Grantmaking by All Foundation Types, 2003 to 200897 
 
                                                                                                        
96 See id. (discussing the results of a survey of foundation CEOs in which “[e]ase of 
assessing outcomes” was frequently cited as the rationale for their expressed preference for 
program support); FRUMKIN, supra note 8, at 191 (discussing donor beliefs that program 
support “make[s] accountabilty, reporting, and assessment easier”).  
97 These data are drawn from the following sources. FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2010, 
supra note 79, at 31; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2009, supra note 89, at 31; FOUNDATION 
GIVING TRENDS 2008, supra note 93, at 36; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2007, supra note 93, 
at 40; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2006, supra note 93, at 42; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 
2005, supra note 93, at 36. 
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Figure 4. Distribution of Program Support Grants as a Percentage of  
Total Grantmaking by All Foundation Types, 2003 to 200898 
 
 
 
Figure 3 shows that the proportion of foundation funding by the 
sampled foundations allocated to general support has declined 
slightly. It displays the distribution of general-support grants as a 
percentage of total giving by all foundation types, measured in grant 
dollars and number of grants, for the six-year period covering 2003 to 
2008. While the percentage of grants for general support by number 
has remained relatively flat, Figure 3 shows that by grant dollars, the 
general support distribution is decreasing relative to other areas. In 
comparison, Figure 4 shows program support levels for the same 
group of foundations. It illustrates that the dollar allocation to grants 
for program support is on the rise. From 2003 to 2008, the proportion 
of total foundation spending on program support has increased by 
more than six percentage points, while the number of such grants has 
increased by less than one percentage point. Thus, the Foundation 
Center’s statistics suggest that as foundations shift toward larger 
grants,99 they also are directing more and more of their grant funds to 
restricted purposes.  
C. Expansion of Foundation-Initiated Grantmaking 
Another increasingly popular trend is proactive grantmaking. The 
idea behind this trend is that effective funders should not sit around 
and wait for good ideas to reach a program officer’s desk; instead 
                                                                                                        
98 These data are drawn from the following sources. FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2010, 
supra note 79, at 31; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2009, supra note 89, at 31; FOUNDATION 
GIVING TRENDS 2008, supra note 93, at 36; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2007, supra note 93, 
at 40; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2006, supra note 93, at 42. 
99 See supra Part II.A. 
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they should employ a proactive, foundation-initiated approach to 
finding the recipient-organizations they want to carry out their project 
ideas. Therefore, some proactive donors simply contact specific 
nonprofit organizations and invite submissions. Others have used a 
modified request for proposal (RFP) system: the RFPs describe “in 
great detail what the donor wants to accomplish and how the program 
should be carried out.”100 Like the other trends documented in this 
Part, the move toward foundation-initiated grantmaking projects often 
stems from a desire to be considered strategic or to prove impact.101 
This Section presents the results of a study of foundation policies 
regarding their openness to unsolicited grant proposals. The data 
reveal that closed and semi-closed grant-proposal policies, which 
were exceedingly rare fifteen years ago, are becoming significantly 
more common. Although time consuming for foundation staff, open-
application processes allow funders to be responsive to the needs and 
ideas of public charities. In contrast, proactive grantmaking, despite 
its efficiencies, is subject to criticism because it “appears to assume 
that the donor knows more about how to solve a given social problem 
than the service delivery community in the field.”102 Below I briefly 
describe the methods of data collection and then report the principal 
findings.  
1. Method 
The analysis is based on comparisons of two paired sets of data on 
proposal-acceptance policies of foundations. It offers a sense of the 
foundation sector’s openness to ideas and potential solutions offered 
by community-based organizations and other organizations as the 
guiding source for funded projects. 
The first paired set compares the proposal-acceptance policies of 
the largest independent103 and corporate foundations104 in 1994 and 
                                                                                                        
100 FRUMKIN, supra note 8, at 194. 
101 See JOEL J. OROSZ, THE INSIDER’S GUIDE TO GRANTMAKING: HOW FOUNDATIONS 
FIND, FUND, AND MANAGE EFFECTIVE PROGRAMS 26–28 (2000) (labeling the most extreme 
version of this as “peremptory” and describing a “[w]e fund the best we can imagine, and no 
others need apply” attitude as “extremely strategic”); see also CONRAD N. HILTON FOUND., For 
Grantseekers,  http://www.hiltonfoundation.org/grantmaking/grantseekers (last visited Mar. 1, 
2011) (“The Foundation does not encourage unsolicited proposals for funding. . . . This 
proactive approach helps us maximize effectiveness and impact.”); COMMUNITY FOUND. 
SARASOTA COUNTY (FL), Competitive Grantmaking, https://www.cfsarasota.org/grants 
/competitivegrantmaking/tabid/291/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (noting that because 
donors are “requiring more accountability and impact” the foundation shifted “from a largely 
‘reactive’ to a more ‘proactive’ approach to grantmaking”). 
102 FRUMKIN, supra note 8, at 194. 
103 An independent foundation refers to a private nonoperating foundation that does not 
directly deliver any charitable programs or services. By far the largest type of foundation, 
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2008. For this comparison, the populations included all independent 
and corporate foundations on the lists of the 100 largest foundations 
by total giving and by asset size from the 1994 and 2008 editions of 
the Foundation Directory.105 Those lists generated a population of 
116 foundations for 1994 and 90 foundations for 2008, after 
community foundations106 and private operating foundations107 were 
excluded. 
In addition to examining the very largest foundations, I also sought 
to review the practices of a broader cross section of independent and 
corporate foundations. The second set of data also looks at grant-
acceptance practices, but compares two randomly drawn samples of 
100 independent and corporate foundations with a wider range of 
sizes. Again, community foundations and private operating 
foundations were excluded, as well as foundations with assets of less 
than $10 million. The random samples were also drawn from the 
1994 and 2008 editions of the Foundation Directory.108  
For both data sets, a research assistant examined each entry in the 
directory to determine whether the foundation indicated that grant 
recipients were selected (1) by invitation only, (2) primarily by 
invitation with unsolicited proposals rarely funded, or (3) by an open 
selection process designated in the Directory as “Accepting 
Applications.” All of the data was compiled in July and August 2009.  
                                                                                                        
 
independent foundations make grants supported by an endowment; they usually do not raise 
funds or seek grants. Generally, they receive funding primarily from one source, such as an 
individual or a family. A private foundation is required to distribute approximately 5% of its 
assets annually to public charities or their equivalents. See I.R.C. § 4942 (2006) (imposing a tax 
on a private foundation’s undistributed income).  
104 A corporate foundation is a private foundation subject to all of the same laws and 
regulations as an independent foundation. In the field, the name suggests that instead of 
receiving funding from an individual or family, the primary funding source is a corporation.  
105 See FOUND. CTR., THE FOUNDATION DIRECTORY: 1994 EDITION (Margaret Mary 
Feczko & Elizabeth H. Rich eds., 16th ed. 1994); FOUND. CTR., THE FOUNDATION DIRECTORY: 
2008 EDITION (David G. Jacobs ed., 30th ed. 2008). 
106 A community foundation is classified as a public charity rather than as a private 
foundation. Instead of receiving most of its funding from a single source like independent 
foundations, corporate foundations, and operating foundations, community foundations seek 
funding from many individuals to engage in grantmaking focused on a particular geographic 
area. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi). 
107 A private operating foundation is a private foundation that primarily carries out its own 
charitable programs, like a publicly supported charity, instead of engaging in grantmaking. The 
operating foundation must spend substantially all of its income on the activities for which it is 
organized and operated. See I.R.C. § 4942(j)(3) (defining an “operating foundation”). 
108 In selecting the foundations to be included in the sample, I used the identification 
numbers assigned to each foundation in the directory. I then used an Internet-based research 
random-sampling program to select the foundations for inclusion while minimizing bias. See 
RESEARCH RANDOMIZER, http://www.randomizer.org (last visited Mar. 3, 2011).  
 1/13/2011 11:14:11 PM 
2011] WHO’S AFRAID OF PHILANTHROCAPITALISM? 29 
2. Data and Summary Results 
Figure 5 presents the percentage distribution of grant-application 
policies for the largest independent and corporate foundations in 1994 
and 2008. The charts reveal that just 6% of all large foundations had 
an invitation-only grant policy in 1994. By 2008, that percentage had 
increased to 29%. This sizeable and statistically significant 
difference109 demonstrates that today’s large foundations are 
substantially more likely to have a “don’t call us, we’ll find you” 
approach when it comes to application practices and interaction with 
potential grantees. 
Collecting the same data on a broader set of foundations, I found 
similar results. In 1994, only 10% of the sampled foundations had 
adopted a proactive grantmaking style in which they declined to 
consider unsolicited proposals. As shown in Figure 6, by 2008 nearly 
half (48%) of the independent and corporate foundations sampled 
reported that their grantmaking was overwhelmingly foundation 
initiated. In this set, the difference was also statistically significant.110 
 
Figure 5. Distribution of Application-Acceptance Practices 
of the Largest Independent and Corporate Foundations,  
1994 and 2008 
 
 
                                                                                                        
109 The difference between the paired population sets of large foundations was statistically 
significant at the 1% significance level in a two-tailed test. 
110 The difference between the paired random samples of foundations was statistically 
significant at the 1% significance level in a two-tailed test. 
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Figure 6. Distribution of Application-Acceptance Practices of Independent and 
Corporate Foundations from a Random Sample of 100 Foundations,  
1994 and 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The foundations studied were more than four times as likely to 
have adopted an invitation-only grant-screening policy in 2008 as in 
the mid-1990s.  
3. Limitations of the Study 
This study necessarily is limited by the data and the data sources, 
and a few observations are worth noting. First, although foundations 
may have formal invitation-only grant-proposal policies, they may 
invite competition among potential grantees through targeted RFP 
competitions. Sometimes advertised and open to any applicant 
meeting the proposal guidelines and sometimes limited to a number 
of preselected organizations, the use of RFPs is nevertheless generally 
considered a form of proactive, foundation-driven grantmaking.111 A 
foundation that regularly uses this method as the means for grantee 
organizations to put their own ideas in front of funders may be 
classified as “invitation only” in the directory. Second, some 
foundations that require an invitation for a full “formal” proposal do 
meet with organizations, review preliminary letters of inquiry, or 
engage in other informal communications with a wide range of 
organizations. Thus, there may be varying degrees of openness to 
public charities at a pre-grant proposal stage by private foundations 
with an “invitation only” policy. Third, the quality of the data is 
limited by the reliability of the information regarding proposal 
acceptance listed in the Directory. As a general reference source on 
thousands of U.S. private foundations, some of the underlying profile 
                                                                                                        
111 See FRUMKIN, supra note 8, at 194. 
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information may be out of date, mistaken, or misreported. That being 
said, I have no reason to suspect any material differences between the 
1994 and 2008 versions. 
These limitations underscore the often complex and idiosyncratic 
relationships between private foundations and grant-seeking entities. 
Although the study documents formal policies as published in the 
directory of foundations, the interactions on the ground may be more 
nuanced and complicated. Whatever the nuances, however, there has 
been a rather dramatic shift in the stated formal policies on proposal 
acceptance announced in the Directory; this suggests that the 
practices and disposition of many grantmakers has shifted. 
D. Implications 
Together, Figures 1 and 2 and Table 1 show that large foundations 
are increasing both the absolute and proportional amount of grant 
dollars allocated to exceptionally large grants. Although not every 
grantmaker is capable of awarding grants at the $10 million-plus 
level, foundations of all sizes appear to be expressly moving toward 
making fewer grants in larger amounts.112 When foundations alter 
their grantmaking philosophy by shifting toward larger grants, they 
most often justify the approach by arguing that a smaller number of 
larger grants produces greater societal impact.113 
This efficiency argument is complicated, however, by considering 
who might be harmed by such reallocations and what cultural changes 
might result. On the one hand, many foundations view the shift to 
larger grants as a smart, tactical “move away from disjointed and 
dissipated gift giving” and an acknowledgment of the reality that 
some projects may require significant resources to achieve certain 
objectives.114 On the other hand, however, this shift may leave certain 
                                                                                                        
112 See, e.g., Press Release, Wash. Reg’l Ass’n of Grantmakers, Grantmakers in 
Washington Region Anticipate Making Fewer, But Larger Grants in 2009 (Nov. 12, 2008), 
available at http://www.washingtongrantmakers.org/s_wash/bin.asp?CID=4501&DID=21499& 
DOC=FILE.PDF (stating that 47% of D.C.-area private foundations anticipated making fewer 
but larger grants). 
113 See Justin Cord Hayes, Foundation Changing Philosophy About Grants: The High 
Point Community Foundation Will Award Larger Grants to Fewer Agencies, GREENSBORO 
NEWS & REC. (N.C.), Aug. 11, 2004, at A1 (quoting the executive director’s explanation of the 
foundation’s policy shift as “Our grants committee has decided it wants to be able to award 
large enough grants to have a significant impact on programs that could dramatically change the 
quality of life in[the community]”); Randy Krehbiel, Foundation Makes Its Point: $25.5 Million 
Grant to UA Aims at Big Impact in Geriatrics, TULSA WORLD, Feb. 5, 1997, at A-1 (quoting a 
local foundation’s executive director who explained that while “[m]ost foundations give much 
smaller amounts to more organizations,” his particular foundation did not because “[o]ur 
trustees determined they wanted to truly make an impact” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
114 FRUMKIN, supra note 8, at 193. 
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groups out. Pablo Eisenberg, a senior fellow at Georgetown 
University’s Center for Public & Nonprofit Leadership, argues that 
“[f]ar fewer awards will go to local community-organizing groups 
and to nascent, small nonprofit groups.”115 After all, with larger grants 
come higher stakes, which often lead funders toward accepting less 
risk, at least with respect to interacting with new or marginalized 
groups. The high stakes also may encourage foundation staff to adopt 
a more hands-on approach in an attempt to protect their 
“investment.”116 The concentration on big projects suggests an 
underlying belief that we already have the answers to big problems, 
but lack the funding to solve them. It neglects, however, the real 
possibility that we do not yet have the solutions and that we need 
more experimentation and innovation, a mindset that cuts toward less 
concentration. In this view, the problem is that accountability 
pressures on individual foundations—from board members and 
others—now push foundations toward big grants, ignoring the 
benefits of spreading the wealth.  
The final point is that the large-grant trend may also unwittingly 
encourage private foundations to place themselves more firmly in the 
driver’s seat. When a foundation makes a systematic decision to give 
larger grants to a smaller and more selective number of organizations, 
there is an unstated presumption that the grantmaker will chose grant 
recipients wisely. Thus, at least in part, the move signals a 
foundation’s heightened confidence in its ability to make high-risk 
philanthropic bets. Significantly, the dollar values associated with 
what constitutes “large” and “small” grants are relative terms, almost 
always defined from the perspective of the donor foundation (using 
its historic baselines) rather than that of the recipient charity. In this 
respect, the decision to shift toward larger grants reinforces the 
foundation-centric orientation I see as endemic to the new 
philanthropy. 
                                                                                                        
115 Pablo Eisenberg, Editorial, A Foundation’s Attempt to Make a Difference May Produce 
the Opposite Result, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Nov. 29, 2007, at 33. 
116 Some foundations, in an attempt to embrace philanthrocapitalism principles, have 
begun to think of or refer to grants as investments.  See, e.g., The Legatum Found., Our Mission, 
http://www.legatum.org/OurApproach.aspx (last visited April 8, 2011); The Rhode Island 
Found., Strategy Grants, http://www.rifoundation.org/Nonprofits/GrantOpportunities/Strategy 
Grants/tabid/350/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2011); Press Release, Social Venture 
Partners, Social Venture Partners Continues to Grow and Give −$26.5 Million in Grant 
Investments Made to More than 300 Nonprofit Organizations (June 17, 2008), available at 
http://www.svpbouldercounty.org/files/SVP%20Network%20Grants%20$26%205M_0.pdf; see 
also Sean Stannard-Stockton, Op-Ed, Providing the Capital Organizations Need to Run — and 
Grow, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Oct. 1, 2009, at 37 (“As many philanthropists have rushed to 
use the currently trendy vocabulary of financial investments when they talk about giving, the 
meaning of the word “investment” has become confused.”). 
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For public charities seeking grants, the shift toward more project 
funding and relatively less unrestricted general support by private 
foundations, as reflected in Figures 3 and 4, creates significant 
conflicts and challenges. The narrow tailoring of program grants 
requires detailed planning in the early stages, which can benefit an 
organization in the execution phase. This diversion of effort makes it 
more difficult to devote resources to organizational capacity building 
or to sustain on-going core activities, however.117 The problem is 
exacerbated by the fact that most grant-seeking charities attempt to 
limit internal administrative (i.e., overhead or organizational) 
expenses because the nonprofit marketplace already penalizes 
organizations if their administrative-to-program expense ratio appears 
high.118 Thus, if grantmakers’ focus on program support begins to 
detract from support for general operations, it also begins to convey 
the message that investments in recruiting and retaining high-quality 
staff, developing infrastructure to support activities, and other forms 
of organizational capacity-building are not valued.119  
Grantseekers have long faced tremendous variability in dealing 
with grant application processes as they searched for funding. Figures 
                                                                                                        
117 See FRUMKIN, supra note 8, at 192 (“As more and more funders have sought leverage 
through project giving, some nonprofits have complained about the difficulty of sustaining core 
activities.”). 
118 See Jeffrey L. Bradach et al., Delivering on the Promise of Nonprofits, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Dec. 2008, at 88, 91, 97 (describing how donors’ preference that their contributions go to 
programs has resulted in the proliferation of new programs and the underinvestment in overhead 
expenses); see also Evelyn Brody, The Twilight of Organizational Form for Charity: Musings 
On Norman Silber, A Corporate Form of Freedom: The Emergence of the Modern Nonprofit 
Sector, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1261, 1270–71 (2002) (book review) (discussing pressures 
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29 (“Sixty-two percent of Americans think that charities spend too much money on overhead 
costs such as fund raising and administration . . . .”). But see CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND. 
UNIV., PAYING FOR OVERHEAD STUDY 1 (2007), available at http://www.philanthropy.iupui. 
edu/research/33537%20Rev%20Overheard%20Book.pdf (“[While n]onprofit professionals 
believe that foundations prefer to pay for program expenses instead of overhead expenses. . . . 
more than two-thirds (69 percent) of responding foundations indicated they are willing to fund 
all types of nonprofit overhead expenses. . . . Still, 64.5 percent of foundations report they do 
not have a history of funding administrative costs.”). 
119 There are some high-profile exceptions to this trend that have placed an emphasis on 
capacity-building grants for nonprofit organizations, such as the Edna McConnell Clark 
Foundation. See Ben Gose, A Singular Focus on Kids, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Feb. 9, 2006, at 
7, 13 (describing the Foundation’s grantmaking strategy which is focused on unrestricted grants 
with grantees “encouraged to use [funds] to develop their central-office capabilities”). It is also 
worth noting that some notable philanthrocapitalists have engaged in capacity-building 
grantmaking. But, general support and capacity-building grants are not considered the same by 
grant recipients. General support provides the recipient with full discretion to use funding as it 
determines necessary usually to meet on-going needs whereas  “[c]apacity-building grants are 
synonymous with change” intended to alter the organization in some specific way.  Lee Draper, 
When Capacity-Building Grants Flatline, FOUND. NEWS & COMMENT., May/June 2003, 
available at http://www.foundationnews.org/CME/ article.cfm?ID=2489. 
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5 and 6 reveal that increasingly foundations are creating a new hurdle 
by adopting invitation-only policies with respect to grant requests. 
Suggestions that proactive grantmaking is somehow more rigorous or 
strategic are unproven and dubious. The answers to most community 
problems do not rest in the offices of foundation staff; grantmakers 
that think they hold all the solutions may end up imposing them on 
communities without the support or engagement necessary for 
sustained success. From my perspective, the increase in invitation-
only grant-proposal policies, especially when combined with the 
increase in large grants and restricted-purpose grants, signal the 
degree to which foundations are more assertively using their power 
and placing themselves in the driver’s seat to control the agenda of 
nonprofit-sector projects. This quiet shift seems to say something 
important about the confidence funders have in their ability to 
envision and initiate effective problem solving from the top down.  
In the final analysis, philanthrocapitalism may not be the cause for 
each of these three trends, but the movement has encouraged and 
accelerated the expansion of several of these practices, particularly as 
certain tenets—most notably the emphasis on measurable impact— 
morph and are reinterpreted by other foundations and their trustees. 
The deeper, underlying connection I see between these trends and the 
rhetoric and practices so closely identified with philanthrocapitalism 
and strategic grantmaking is the emphasis on the funder’s needs, 
desires, goals, and power. It is this subtle turn toward a more 
foundation-centric approach to problem solving that muffles the 
voices of the nonprofit organizations working in the field and the 
communities they serve. The philosophy of philanthrocapitalism 
positions being “strategic” against being “responsive” to community 
needs, as those needs are articulated by the nonprofit organizations 
that work most closely with them. But these objectives are not 
necessarily opposites and should not be viewed as working against 
each other. 
III. THE DANGERS OF PHILANTHROCAPITALISM 
Philanthropy is at a critical moment of reinvention. The extensive 
financial resources and prominent visibility of those represented by 
“new philanthropy” certainly make their reforms worthy of careful 
scrutiny. The advocates of philanthrocapitalism believe that the new 
business-oriented, foundation-focused approach to giving will free 
nonprofits “to think long-term, to go against conventional wisdom, 
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[and] to take up ideas too risky for government.”120 My less sanguine 
view is that by overemphasizing these goals—casting them as 
requisites for effectiveness—they may be too easily misappropriated 
or misinterpreted by grantmaking foundations and end up 
undermining efforts to strengthen the nonprofit sector. This Part 
discusses several concerns associated with the corporatization of 
philanthropy and how the tenets of philanthrocapitalism and the 
muscular philanthropy it encourages may negatively impact the 
effectiveness of the nonprofit sector, generate spillover effects that 
erode or skew individual giving and government support for social 
change, and alter the ways in which we think about philanthropic and 
democratic values.  
A. Misapplication of Business Concepts 
1. Overemphasizing Metrics 
We have seen that proponents of philanthrocapitalism often 
differentiate themselves from other socially minded actors, including 
more traditional philanthropic entities, by describing their efforts as 
uniquely “results-oriented.”121 In doing so, they imply that others 
either do not really care about results and outcomes or that others 
measure things that are less important, e.g., inputs. Many have praised 
this focus on metrics as a hard-nosed and business-savvy approach to 
grantmaking,122 and there is little doubt that the trend is spreading.123 
                                                                                                        
120 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 12. 
121 See, e.g., BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 87 (quoting a philanthrocapitalist from the 
hedge fund industry); HELMUT K. ANHEIER & DIANA LEAT, CREATIVE PHILANTHROPY 21 
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sector’s “greater emphasis on measurable results”); Jon Gertner, For Good, Measure, N.Y. 
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(“[F]oundations and their grantees are themselves deliberately becoming more like big business, 
adopting [a] very measurement-obsessed approach . . . .”); Adam Thomas, Nonprofits Face 
Important Challenges, Smith Says as Conference Opens, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 23, 2010 
(paraphrasing Steven Rathgeb Smith, the Waldemar A. Nielson Chair in Philanthropy at 
Georgetown University who delivered the opening keynote address for the “Future of the 
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One legal scholar pithily observes that “[o]ld-style charity is out. 
Performance metrics[ and] business jargon . . . are in.”124 However, it 
is important to state the obvious: an overemphasis on metrics and an 
insistent effort to measure things that sometimes, by their very nature, 
cannot be measured can end up harming rather than improving 
philanthropy.  
My point is not to argue that assessment and measurement are 
wholly out of place in the social sector. Rather, the point is simply 
that the lack of universal measures such as profit—so easily applied 
in the for-profit world—makes nonprofit assessment far more 
complex.125 Philanthrocapitalism seems to fail to acknowledge such 
difficulties and to advance the myth that the measurement of 
nonprofit performance and goals is merely a matter of discipline, will, 
and intellectual power. 
Funders should remain mindful of the fact that not all desirable 
social outcomes can be easily or accurately measured. Instead, the 
goals of philanthropic work reach beyond concrete, instrumentalized 
targets set by a stern manager, and extend to such intangible ideals as 
community empowerment, justice, creativity, compassion, 
expression, preservation of legacies, or the like. For example, 
Professors Scott Cummings and Deborah Rhode have noted this 
difficulty of accurate performance measurement is particularly 
evident in many public-interest legal contexts, where they ask, “How 
do we price due process?”126 When charitable programs address 
intangible ideals, they are usually seeking to intervene in a complex 
network of activities that make up vast social and economic systems. 
I am not persuaded that either foundations or experienced business 
executives can successfully reduce these goals into accurately 
measurable component parts without risking oversimplification, 
distortion, or the devaluing of those ideals. Like it or not, success is 
complicated, and public goods are not easily reducible to categories 
similar to those used to calculate profits.  
Furthermore, many outcomes cannot be predicted in advance or 
determined in the short term, and the correlation between a 
                                                                                                        
 
Nonprofit Sector in Delaware and the Nation” Conference, as saying that “government and 
private funders [are] placing more emphasis on evaluation and performance measurements”). 
124 Pozen, supra note 22, at 321. 
125 See Deborah L. Rhode, Rethinking the Public in Lawyers’ Public Service: Pro Bono, 
Strategic Philanthropy, and the Bottom Line, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1451 (2009) 
(discussing the difficulty of quantifying the “social return” on an investment). 
126 Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Litigation: Insights from 
Theory and Practice, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 603, 634 (2009). 
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contribution and specific outcomes is not always clear. For example, 
one traditional philanthropic technique, which ironically has been 
embraced by philanthrocapitalism, has been the use of prizes.127 But 
one of the most prominent prize initiatives, widely viewed as 
successful, does not lend itself well to outcome measurement. The 
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation’s Fellows Program, 
often referred to by the nickname “the genius awards,”128 provides 
unrestricted, “no strings attached” grants “to talented individuals who 
have shown extraordinary originality and dedication in their creative 
pursuits and a marked capacity for self-direction.”129 In a volume 
describing some of the most important and influential examples of 
foundation grantmaking initiatives, the authors acknowledge that “the 
[MacArthur Fellows] program’s effectiveness [is] difficult to 
judge. . . . [E]ach MacArthur fellowship is a risk, the return on which 
is impossible to determine.”130 Yet, despite these measurement 
challenges, most observers have little problem in considering the 
prestigious program “an investment well-made.”131  
A further concern is that even when we think we have designed 
appropriate metrics, experience has shown that we may not have 
included relevant variables or that we cannot predict the proper 
measures in advance. Take the example of the Children’s Television 
Workshop (CTW), which created Sesame Street—unquestionably one 
of the most successful developments in educational television 
programming, and originally funded by the Ford Foundation and the 
Carnegie Corporation.132 The early reports determined that Sesame 
Street failed to meet its primary measurable strategic objective, 
namely, to close the educational gap between minority and 
underprivileged children and middle-class children.133 Thus, it was 
labeled a failure in some circles because it did not meet its key metric. 
Under the philanthrocapitalism model, CTW might have had its 
funding cut off because of its failure to deliver the promised results. 
In this instance, however, it turned out that it was the metric that was 
the problem, not the program’s effectiveness. In fact, Sesame Street 
                                                                                                        
127 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 112–13 (“Philanthrocapitalists believe that 
incentive prizes can potentially leverage their money many times over.”). 
128 See, e.g., Nicole Wallace, Founder of Rural Health Clinic Is Among 25 Winners of 
‘Genius’ Grants, CHRON. PHILANTRHOPY, Oct. 2, 2008, at 39. 
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131 Id. 
132 Id. at 99. 
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was improving educational outcomes for millions of disadvantaged 
children. The problem was that all children—black and white, rich 
and poor alike—were drawn to the program, thereby neutralizing the 
intended compensatory effect and actually exacerbating the 
educational gap.134 
The lesson here is that even when the parties agree on reliable 
metrics, how the metrics are used matters. Flexible metrics can be 
helpful tools in the field if those closest to the ground need to have 
control over them. Grantees need to be empowered to critique and 
change plans, directions, and even the metrics themselves when 
necessary. Flexible metrics can guide operating nonprofits and their 
funders, working collaboratively. Conversely, rigid metrics used to 
discipline grant recipients undermine relationships and limit the 
usefulness of measurement. If metrics are used primarily as a top-
down tool to evaluate charities (i.e., to punish organizations if the 
foundation’s goals are not achieved), the narrow focus on specific 
measurements may backfire and “may inhibit learning from 
experience and degrade performance.”135 Although this distinction is 
not made to make claims about the experiences of all funders, it 
illustrates the tensions and risks associated with attempts to measure 
social impact.  
Even more troubling are the negative side effects associated with 
an emphasis on nonprofit performance measurement. Simply put, it 
makes people preoccupied with achieving specific goals. While in 
some instances such intense focus may yield positive results, it can 
also cause people to narrow their focus in ways that may be harmful 
to larger objectives or values.136 As a result, charities, under pressure 
from funders, can become so focused on achieving specific targets or 
metrics that they run the risk of losing sight of broader goals, which 
may be related or unrelated to measured targets. Findings from 
several well-known studies of inattentional blindness illustrate the 
point. These studies document the phenomenon of people being 
unable to perceive things in plain sight because they are so focused on 
a particular task.137 Similarly, a heightened emphasis on a small 
                                                                                                        
134 See id. at 101. 
135 Lisa D. Ordóñez et al., Goals Gone Wild: The Systematic Side Effects of 
Overprescribing Goal Setting, ACAD. MGMT. PERSP., Feb. 2009, at 6, 11. 
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number of high-stakes metrics might diminish the ability of nonprofit 
executives to focus on other matters and to engage in creative 
problem solving. For example, in the elementary-education context, a 
foundation focused on easily available performance measures might 
cause a grantee charter school to focus narrowly on hitting certain 
standardized test targets in verbal and math skills. Such a focus, 
however, could inadvertently cause the charity to fail to see or 
address shortcomings in other areas, such as critical reasoning, 
writing, higher-order problem solving, creativity, or leadership 
development skills.138 
Additionally, overemphasis on measurement may lead 
organizations to focus on what is easily measured rather than what is 
most important. This distortion may be especially pronounced as 
foundations “invest” through a smaller number of high-dollar grants, 
giving funders greater power.139 The emphasis on measurable results 
may make grantseekers “reluctant to ‘swing for the fences’ on 
‘complicated, messy, seemingly insoluble problems’ where charitable 
funds and creativity are most needed.”140 Measurement frenzy may 
also incentivize charities to ignore groups or peoples deemed difficult 
to reach. 
Put differently, measurement in the social sector is immensely 
complicated. Often, attempts to measure the immeasurable do not 
answer the hard questions, fail to measure what planners hope to 
capture, or skew behavior in unintentional ways. Sometimes the 
process of measurement imposes rigidity on a fluid and dynamic 
social process and naively attempts to govern or control complex, 
interrelated systems and events to an extent that is simply not 
realistic.141 In the excitement of this more pronounced emphasis on 
metrics as an accountability tool, proponents have largely overstated 
the benefits of performance measurement, while understating its 
harms. Indeed the business world customarily privileges market 
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139 See supra Part II. 
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share, growth rates, and investment rates of return over 
empowerment, participation, and the quality of relationships—but 
civil society may not benefit from the same approach to 
philanthropy.142 As this trend grows “it is conceivable that 
philanthropy itself might be demeaned by a process that depends less 
and less on the bond of trust between . . . a foundation and its 
beneficiary and more and more on an algorithm that calculates the 
quantitative return on a grant.”143  
Statistics and measurement have a place in philanthropy, but I 
worry that the language and approach of philanthrocapitalism may 
overemphasize their effectiveness and obfuscate their appropriate 
role. A philanthropic culture dominated by quantifiable targets can 
significantly harm overall performance rather than promote better 
solutions. Metrics can sometimes be used effectively by 
philanthropists. In some settings, they can provide helpful 
information for problem diagnosis or midcourse corrections, but too 
many foundations have become “obsessed with”144 measurement in 
ways that demean and undermine the very philanthropy they seek to 
advance.  
2. Capturing the Meaning of “Strategy” 
Philanthrocapitalism equates “serious” philanthropy with the 
adoption of business principles.145 There is no question that 
grantmaking is serious work, but that alone does not make it the 
province of business. In other words, business and market-based 
practices and processes have no monopoly on effectiveness.  
A central problem with the rhetoric of philanthrocapitalism is that 
it mistakenly conflates “businesslike” and “strategy,” two concepts 
that should not be presumed to go hand-in-hand. Those who have 
worked in and with many for-profit businesses as well as nonprofit 
organizations understand that sound analytical thinking and wise 
decision making may be found in both sectors, just as bastions of 
mediocrity may also be found.146 Especially with the hindsight of the 
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recent financial crisis, we know that private enterprise does not hold 
all the answers. 
Profit maximization lies at the heart of capitalism, while 
philanthropy is concerned with altruism and the betterment of 
humankind.147 When philanthrocapitalism glorifies business models 
and practices as the standard for excellence and effectiveness, it 
misses this crucial difference and inevitably disparages the nonprofit 
sector. It is important that we guard against efforts to co-opt broad, 
positive terms like “strategic” or “effective” and turn them into 
synonyms for businesslike or market-based. 
B. Transforming Nonprofit Institutions 
1. Foundation vs. Charity Expertise 
Although the nonprofit sector is a central element of American life 
and is steadily gaining recognition, it remains one of the least 
understood and most undervalued elements.148 Unfortunately, the 
rhetoric and tenets of philanthrocapitalism only exacerbate the 
problem. Just beneath the surface of efforts to incorporate business 
and the market into charitable giving lies an attack on traditional 
foundations, and in some iterations, there may also be an implicit 
attack on public charities as well. While perhaps not intentional, the 
new muscular philanthropy casts most nonprofit organizations as 
crisis-prone, desperately poor, starry-eyed, even witless do-gooders. 
This characterization can lead to condescension and fractured 
relationships.149 Of course, I should be careful not to overstate this 
point. It must be remembered that funders are still, for the most part, 
conducting their philanthropic work through grantee public charities, 
money and power differentials have always caused strains in grantor-
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grantee relationships,150 and some small nonprofits (as well as small 
businesses) do fit the stereotype. However, the language and methods 
of philanthrocapitalism do emphasize the unique ability of an elite 
class of funders to employ their business know-how because “they 
know how to fix problems, for that is what they do all day in 
business.”151 This idolization of business skills and experience 
coupled with a desire to ensure that the funder remains firmly in the 
driver’s seat in the grantor-grantee relationship152 heightens the sense 
among both funders and their recipients that there has been a shift in 
the locus of control in that relationship. Put bluntly, 
philanthrocapitalism seems to encourage the myth of a huge gap in 
the strategic expertise, sophistication, and level of quality between 
business entities and nonprofit organizations. To accept that view, of 
course, leaves us with a weakened, essentialized view of nonprofit 
organizations. Accordingly, philanthrocapitalism may inadvertently 
advance a notion that grant-recipient charities, almost by definition, 
lack clearheadedness and thus should only be instrumentalized to 
achieve the foundation’s objectives.  
This characterization—even if only implied—is particularly 
damaging because it is happening at a moment in time when the 
stature and standing of nonprofit organizations has been on the rise in 
many circles.153 The case for the emerging strength of the nonprofit 
sector has been stronger during this period than at any other time in 
history. Simply put, the underestimation of nonprofit effectiveness 
embedded in philanthrocapitalism is in sharp contradiction to a 
growing discourse and acknowledgment over the past three decades 
that an increasing number of nonprofit organizations are becoming 
world class. In several arenas, for instance on the international stage, 
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nonprofits are becoming powerful players, respected by governments 
and corporations as equals at the table. For example, from the vantage 
point of the U.S. presidency, Bill Clinton has stated that the influence 
of the charitable sector “has been reinforced by the proven ability of 
[nonprofit organizations] of all sizes and missions to have a positive 
effect on problems at home and abroad.”154 
In its most extreme forms, strategic philanthropy is excessively 
controlling. Foundations that seek to impose their vision, their 
strategic frameworks, and their metrics on a nonprofit grant recipient 
is often unduly intrusive and may thereby weaken the organizations 
they are funding. Of course, only a few foundations may have pushed 
this model to its extremes, but it serves as a reminder that a 
foundation’s drive to achieve results can have negative effects. 
Moreover, as I noted above in Part II, in recent years a significant 
percentage of foundations have shifted to a “don’t call us, we’ll call 
you” philosophy of considering grant proposals.155 Rather than just an 
effort to streamline administrative processes, this is an important shift 
toward a more muscular philanthropy, with funders calling the shots 
and perhaps closing themselves off from creative ideas.  
Peter Laugharn, an experienced international foundation executive, 
has criticized the style of philanthropy favored by 
philanthrocapitalists because “the funder may not have sufficient 
understanding of situations and actors to achieve its goals, or enough 
flexibility to adjust its approach when necessary.”156 He warns that an 
overly proactive approach can become “directive, essentially turning 
grantees into contractors, and running the risk of ignoring the 
partners’ strength.”157 This disregard of partner’s strengths is 
surprising given how proponents of philanthrocapitalism frequently 
invoke the language of entrepreneurship and risk taking.  For 
example, when Bishop and Green explain that philanthrocapitalism 
hews to the view that “[t]he best philanthropy often involves taking 
risks, and more risk means more failures, as well as (hopefully) more 
successes,”158 I am left to wonder whose risks they are referring to—
the foundation’s or the public charity’s? For all the talk about its 
embrace of risk taking, philanthrocapitalism seems primarily 
interested in solutions philanthrocapitalists formulate. They seem to 
consider themselves as the ultimate risk takers, not the nonprofit 
institutions they support. Furthermore, they do not seem to consider 
                                                                                                        
154 BILL CLINTON, GIVING: HOW EACH OF US CAN CHANGE THE WORLD 11 (2007). 
155 See supra Part II.C. 
156 Peter Laugharn, Proactive vs Responsive Philanthropy, ALLIANCE, Sept. 2008, at 44. 
157 Id. 
158 BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 79. 
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the risk that comes with undervaluing the contributions and ignoring 
the ideas of those closer to the ground. 
When it comes to addressing social problems, nonprofit 
organizations operating on the ground—i.e., public charities—have a 
central role to play. Society benefits from institutional arrangements 
that seek innovation coming not only from the top, where they are 
centrally planned by a grantmaking foundation, but also from the 
bottom, where those organizations working most directly on public 
problems are continuously refining, modifying, and improving design 
solutions. As several scholars note, those who drive social innovation 
are often those closest to the ground, who have direct contact with the 
challenges that need to be addressed.159 Professor Angela Banks’s 
observation about participatory decision making in constitution 
making fits the nonprofit world as well, where the exercise of tight 
control by private foundations can deprive operating nonprofits of the 
space they need for “innovative solutions and approaches to problems 
. . . that are qualitatively better than the solutions and approaches 
developed in elite or exclusive settings.”160 Such space is even more 
important when the philanthropy focuses on issues of poverty, social 
justice, and community building, because it requires strong 
community-based organizations and locally grounded mediating 
institutions.161  
If donors are serious about strengthening the capacity of the 
charitable sector, an essential precursor to “taking successful projects 
to scale,” is that they should seek to conduct their philanthropy in 
ways that support the development of worthy nonprofits as they 
formulate and pursue their own solutions based on their experience, 
knowledge of problems, direct contact with beneficiaries, and visions 
for social change. As Sheela Patel, the founder and executive director 
                                                                                                        
159 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 314 (1998) (arguing that innovation is spurred by 
those closest to problems); Susan Sturm, Gender Equity Regimes and the Architecture of 
Learning, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 323, 325 (Gráinne de Búrca 
& Joanne Scott eds., 2006) (describing benefits of bottom-up, participatory innovation). 
160 Angela M. Banks, Expanding Participation in Constitution Making: Challenges and 
Opportunities, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1043, 1050 (2008) (discussing the advantages of 
participatory decision making); see also Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Deepening 
Democracy: Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance, 29 POL. & SOC’Y 5, 18 
(2001) (noting the benefits of bottom-up solutions).  
161 See Pablo Eisenberg, Philanthropy and Community Building, 87 NAT’L CIVIC REV. 
169, 169 (1998), reprinted in PABLO EISENBERG, CHALLENGES FOR NONPROFITS AND 
PHILANTHROPY: THE COURAGE TO CHANGE 126 (Stacy Palmer ed., 2005) (noting that the “most 
important” lesson from urban development philanthropy is that community residents must be a 
major part of community problem solving); Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment 
Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 108 (2009) (arguing 
that mediating institutions serve a vital role in maintaining a sense of community). 
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of a nonprofit organization in India working on global poverty relief, 
writes, “[A] fundamental question donors need to ask is this: [D]o 
they want subcontractors to carry out their mission? Or do they want 
to support those who have a vision for their own transformation?”162 
Grantmakers who seek to set the agenda themselves may test their 
preferred solutions, but in so doing may also stifle creativity and 
ambition. Grantmaking at its best employs practices that most 
effectively help nonprofits achieve their missions. 
Consider, for example, the different approaches of the Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation and the Ford Foundation. The Gates 
Foundation, the nation’s largest private foundation,163 which is 
invoked as a paradigmatic example of philanthrocapitalistic 
grantmaking,164 plays an assertive role in setting the philanthropic 
agenda of the grantmaking it underwrites.165 For example, in 
November 2008, the Gates Foundation announced that it planned to 
shift the focus of its education grantmaking from structural change 
(i.e., the creation of small high schools) toward an effort to double the 
number of low-income young people who complete a college degree 
or certificate by age twenty-six.166   
What I find interesting in this example is that both the former and 
the new focus of the Gates Foundation grantmaking is so driven by 
the foundation and its view of the most effective solution to problems 
in the U.S. public education system. Here, the Gates Foundation is 
employing an approach characteristic of philanthrocapitalism—that 
is, it acts largely on its own167 to determine a single strategy for 
education reform (a theory of change), it does the heavy lifting of 
developing potential solutions, and then it goes out to find or create 
organizations to execute its agenda. Notice that “[t]he new approach 
                                                                                                        
162 Sheela Patel, Subcontractors or Visionaries, ALLIANCE, Sept. 2008, at 36, 36. 
163 See Top 100 U.S. Foundations by Asset Size, FOUND. CTR. (Feb. 22, 2011), 
http://foundationcenter.org/findfunders/topfunders/top100assets.html. 
164 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 52 (noting that “Gates has . . . become the 
ultimate philanthrocapitalist”); Joe Nocera, Self-Made Philanthropists, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 
2008, § 6 (Magazine), at 60 (referring to Gates as “[t]he quintessential philanthrocapitalist”).  
165 See, e.g., Julie Schmit, Inside the Gates Foundation; It Has $35 Billion to Give, and 
Strong Ideas About How to Do It, USA TODAY, June 2, 2010, at 6A (“[T]he Gates Foundation 
has been painted by critics and even admirers as sometimes too heavy-handed in saying how its 
money is used and too prone to listening to the recommendations of experts vs. grass-roots 
groups when setting its strategies . . . .”). 
166See Ben Gose, Gates Foundation Unveils New Approach Designed to Improve 
American Education, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Nov. 27, 2008, at 10. 
167 I do not mean to imply that the Gates Foundation does not consult with experts. Rather, 
they make decisions and find nonprofit grantees to execute their vision after the fact. Observers 
have described the Foundation’s decision-making process as “a closed internal process.” See 
Donald G. McNeil, Jr., W.H.O. Official Complains of Gates Foundation Dominance in Malaria 
Research, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2008, at A6 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dr. 
Arata Kochi of the World Health Organization). 
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reflects the foundation’s view that the decade beginning in high 
school and ending at about age 26 is a make-or-break period for low-
income youths.”168 Notably, the Gates Foundation declared its shift 
without the announcement of any specific or even potential grantees. 
Prior to that November announcement, the Foundation had been 
executing a strategy based on its theory of change that creating 
smaller high schools would improve education outcomes. In both 
cases, the Foundation defines the problem, sets the agenda, devises 
the strategy, and determines how long it should take to solve the 
problem. Finding grantee organizations to execute the Foundation’s 
chosen experiment is the last piece of the puzzle.  
In contrast, the Ford Foundation—the nation’s second-largest 
private foundation169 and a favorite target of the new-guard 
philanthropists170—takes a different approach. As any regular listener 
of National Public Radio well knows, the Ford Foundation has long 
sought to summarize its ethos with the tagline “a resource for 
innovative people and institutions worldwide,”171 and more recently, 
as an organization “[w]orking with [v]isionaries on the [f]rontlines of 
[s]ocial [c]hange [w]orldwide.”172 These slogans capture and 
emphasize the Ford Foundation’s focus on embracing the ideas of the 
public charities. Therefore, even in describing its own mission, the 
language clearly places the grant-recipients and their innovative ideas 
at the center of the problem-solving activity undertaken on any given 
issue.173 An example of this approach is cited by Harvard researcher 
Steven Lawry in a recent article in the Stanford Social Innovation 
Review, wherein he describes the Ford Foundation’s initial support 
for Muhammad Yunus and his Grameen Bank, eventual winners of 
the Nobel Peace Prize, which sparked the microfinance movement.174 
                                                                                                        
168 Gose, supra note 166, at 10 (emphasis added). 
169 See supra note 163. 
170 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 158 (describing the Ford Foundation’s 
grantmaking as an example of “unstrategic funding”). 
171 FORD FOUND., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2008). 
172 FORD FOUND., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2009); see also Ian Wilhelm, Slogans Teach 
Public-Radio Listeners About Grant Makers’ Missions, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Oct. 1, 2009, 
at 1 (describing the change in slogans). 
173 See Susan V. Berresford, President, Ford Found., Address at the Nat’l Found. India, 
Philanthropy’s Potential: Can We Grasp It? (Mar. 4, 2002), available at http://www.fordfound. 
org/newsroom/speeches/118 (“Grantmakers will have to become braver about seeking and 
supporting people with unfamiliar approaches and stick with them long enough to learn about 
them. As donors become more strategic in tackling important and difficult problems, they will 
need good advice from people who know how to bring about change, including the most 
disadvantaged men and women who are the likely beneficiaries. We must remember the Ford 
Foundation is not the answer—it is a resource for people who have ideas about the answer.”). 
174 See Steven Lawry, Effective Funding: How Foundations Can Best Support Social 
Innovators, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Spring 2009, at 21 (describing the Ford 
Foundation’s partnership with Grameen Bank). 
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Lawry notes that although the Ford Foundation funding was 
important, the grant recipient led the way. It was Yunus who 
developed the idea, took the lead, and provided the expertise to craft a 
solution to a public problem.175 Lawry argues that this success 
demonstrates that “foundations should open their doors wide to the 
potentially powerful ideas”176 of grant recipients, whose visions, 
ideas, and plans are tested and borne out of “the complex social, 
economic, and political environments in which they live and work.”177 
In my view, the key difference between the approaches is mindset. 
Distilled down to its most simple terms, in one approach the 
foundation perceives itself as an expert decisionmaker using its 
resources to implement chosen technical solutions; in the other, the 
foundation is the facilitator, using its resources to empower 
organizations and communities on the ground to focus on adaptive 
work.178 These two examples highlight some potential long-term 
problems with muscular philanthropy. It is not that muscular 
philanthropy never achieves positive results—it most surely does. 
Sometimes a foundation may adopt a winning strategy. But such a 
myopic approach is underinclusive in promoting social innovation. As 
Lawry writes: 
Innovative grantees, who have the advantages of local 
knowledge, intuitive insights into local social and 
institutional dynamics, and social and professional standing 
in their communities, are in a better position than foundations 
to push and pull the levers that move other essential 
institutions toward adopting the kinds of pro-poor policies 
necessary for their ideas to work.179 
In addition, the trends discussed in Part II suggest that U.S. 
foundations are adopting policies and practices that may decrease 
competition and may isolate these entities from the ideas and 
expertise of organizations working most closely on the ground, 
                                                                                                        
175 Id.  
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 See RONALD A. HEIFETZ, LEADERSHIP WITHOUT EASY ANSWERS 22, 72–76 (1994) 
(distinguishing “technical work” which employs authoritative expertise and mechanical know-
how or established procedures to solve problems from “adaptive work” which requires people 
with the problems to engage in a process to solve problems where they learn new ways, i.e., 
attitudes, behaviors, relationships, etc., internalize the change through experimentation and 
discovery); RONALD A. HEIFETZ & MARTY LINSKY, LEADERSHIP ON THE LINE: STAYING ALIVE 
THROUGH THE DANGERS OF LEADING 13–15 (2002) (making a similar distinction between 
adaptive and technical work). 
179 Lawry, supra note 174, at 22. 
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reducing the prospects for innovation from the bottom to emerge. 
There is evidence that grantmakers are limiting the pool of ideas that 
receive consideration and exerting greater control over the projects 
that they ultimately choose to fund. When foundations instead pick 
which entities they will hear from and which organizations they will 
interact with via invitations for proposals,180 they reduce the 
competition in the marketplace of social ideas. Collectively 
foundations are choosing to concentrate on larger grants, often 
awarding fewer numbers of grants than in the past and giving the 
selected projects larger dollar awards.181 These practices may lend 
themselves to a decrease in experimentation and innovation in the 
social sector.  
Many have applauded the shift to more concentrated grantmaking 
as a means to bring more focus to philanthropy and to provide 
grantees more funding to pursue large-scale initiatives. Of course, 
foundation leaders have always faced a breadth-versus-depth trade-off 
in grantmaking.182 It remains open for debate, however, whether this 
is a sign of a maturing nonprofit sector coalescing around promising 
ideas or simply overconfidence in the grantmakers’ self-perceived 
ability to place charitable bets. Finally, by focusing on targeted 
limited-purpose grants,183 short-term measurable outcomes,184 
leverage, and high engagement, foundations have taken on the 
attributes of a hierarchical, directive, centralized power, usurping both 
the autonomy and energy of the public charities on the ground. In an 
attempt to push the venture capital analogy,185 funders are using their 
power advantage over their grantees to exercise control (sometimes 
aggressively so) over grantee behavior186 and, in some cases, to 
dictate public policy. Even the World Health Organization, the 
powerful public health arm of the United Nations, has expressed 
worry that the Gates Foundation has created a “cartel” in health 
research that “discourages smaller rivals and intellectual 
competition.”187 Similar concerns have been raised about the Gates 
Foundation’s work in other areas as well.188  
                                                                                                        
180 See supra Part II.C. 
181 See supra notes 79–93 and accompanying text. 
182 See JOEL J. OROSZ, EFFECTIVE FOUNDATION MANAGEMENT 93–95 (2007). 
183 See supra Part II.B. 
184 See supra Part III.A.1. 
185 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
186 See supra text accompanying notes 164–81. 
187 BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 72 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
188 See e.g., Schmit, supra note 165 (noting a similar concern expressed regarding work on 
world hunger issues).  
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In many respects, philanthrocapitalism conflicts with the 
preference for experimentation and the aversion to command-and-
control-style management often associated with free-market 
economic theories.189 Once shorn of the philosophical and structural 
strengths of free-market principles, what remains of 
philanthrocapitalism is exceedingly narrow and elitist in scope. Thus 
even on its own terms, philanthrocapitalism is not likely to recreate 
the conditions we associate with effective free markets but instead 
will likely lead only to a concentration of power and decision making 
in the hands of business elites. 
2. Market-Based Solutions 
Philanthrocapitalism, like any movement or theory, embodies a set 
of explicit and implicit values. It expresses a preference for 
entrepreneurial, market-oriented solutions, places an emphasis on 
performance measurement, and attaches overriding importance to the 
guidance of experienced business leaders. To the extent that 
philanthrocapitalism espouses this new set of values, it seeks to alter 
the nature of grantmaking as well as the social change projects and 
experiments undertaken with foundation dollars; funders shape both 
what nonprofits do and how they conduct their activities. These new 
                                                                                                        
189 Free-market-based principles and policies have been embraced because of their ability 
to foster environments that value decentralization over command-and-control approaches, 
encourage creative competition, and promote innovation through experimentation. See, e.g., 
Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 347 (2008); Amy J. Cohen, Dispute Systems Design, Neoliberalism, and 
the Problem of Scale, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 51, 57 (2009); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: 
The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. 
L. REV. 342, 369, 443 (2004); Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a 
Private Property Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 536–537 (2007). Accordingly, traditional 
adherents to market-based principles have long championed environments that cultivate 
learning, broad-based experimentation, and open competition to promote innovation. Friedrich 
Hayek, one of the leading free-market economists of the twentieth century, wrote that 
to do more harm than good . . . to improve the social order, [we] . . . will therefore 
have to use what knowledge [we] can achieve, not to shape the results as the 
craftsman shapes his handiwork, but rather to cultivate a growth by providing the 
appropriate environment, in the manner in which the gardener does this for his 
plants. 
F.A. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 
34 (1978); see also Amy J. Cohen, Governance Legalism: Hayek and Sabel on Reason and 
Rules, Organization and Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 357, 364 n.26. Despite rhetorical appeals to 
the market, in practice, foundations animated by the new philanthropy are increasingly taking on 
dominant roles as central planners, crowding out competition or dissent. As critics of some of 
the prominent philanthrocapitalists have noted and as foundation trends suggest, private 
foundations are asserting greater control in designing philanthropic solutions. To borrow 
Hayek’s analogy, muscular foundations have been acting like the craftsman rather than the 
gardener. 
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values may lead to subtle but important shifts in emphasis regarding 
specific programmatic decisions, which may skew nonprofit grantees 
toward projects that adopt market-based approaches, favor individual 
over collective action, provide clear measurement, and impact 
personnel decisions. 
In the marketplace of social change ideas, where only a limited 
number of ideas or projects are ultimately funded, a funder’s 
preference—whether expressed or not—for certain types of solutions 
carries considerable influence. With its emphasis on applying 
business and market models, as philanthrocapitalism expands it may 
privilege initiatives using market mechanisms to address large-scale 
change. Bishop and Green suggest that some prominent 
philanthrocapitalists seek to support projects that reflect their “view 
that the entrepreneurship of the business world needs to be applied to 
social problems and that often . . . this should involve harnessing the 
profit motive.”190 The authors also state that this approach has 
resonated deeply with a certain class of funders.191 Michael Edwards 
argues, however, that such an emphasis is misplaced because “market 
values and human values are not just different; they pull in opposite 
directions in many important ways.”192 
For instance, consider microfinance, a favorite example of a 
business-inspired solution to address global poverty favored by 
philanthrocapitalists.193 Through the provision of financial services 
(microloans, savings accounts, insurance, etc.) in small amounts, 
usually without monetary collateral requirements, to low-income 
individuals, particularly in the developing world, microfinance has 
been used to support entrepreneurial activity so that individuals can 
rise from poverty and secure their own economic future.194 It is 
incontrovertible that extending access to financial resources and 
                                                                                                        
190 BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 117 (emphasis added). 
191 See id. (“[P]hilanthropreneurship is a challenge that is attracting not only Omidyar and 
Skoll, but also many other entrepreneurial philanthropists.”). 
192 EDWARDS, supra note 74, at 66. 
193 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 130 (“Microfinance is the testing ground for 
[the] belief that for many nonprofits, and social problems, the best strategy is to harness the 
profit motive.”). It is worth noting the irony, however, that microfinance was initially developed 
and widely expanded through “bottom-up” philanthropy. See text accompanying notes 174–77.  
194 See Anita Bernstein, Pecuniary Reparations Following National Crisis: A Convergence 
of Tort Theory, Microfinance, and Gender Equality, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 37 (2009) 
(discussing how microfinance supports women and gender equality); Pamela Das, Avoiding a 
Subprime-Like Crises in Microfinance: Lessons from the Mexican and Bolivian Experience, 15 
L. & BUS. REV. AM. 819, 823 (2009) (discussing the relationship between microfinance and the 
alleviation of poverty); Terry M. Dworkin & Cindy A. Schipani, Linking Gender Equity to 
Peaceful Societies, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 391, 410–14 (2007) (discussing how microfinance supports 
women and gender equality). 
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services to the poor is a beneficial undertaking,195 but microfinance 
may be especially attractive to philanthrocapitalists because it draws 
on market norms and seeks to replicate familiar private sector 
structures. Notice that microfinance as a solution to global poverty is 
focused on reimagining poor individuals primarily as sellers and 
buyers of goods, is based on competition with actors vying with one 
another for a scarce resource (in this case, profit), privileges wealth 
creation over distribution, and is grounded in the idea of individual 
self-help as the driver of change.  
Although microloans may assist individual borrowers, there is no 
evidence that microfinance as an institution has led to systematic 
change transforming poor countries into rich ones or impoverished 
communities into wealthy ones. Edwards argues that microfinance 
will not eradicate poverty on its own.196 In his view, sustainable, 
widespread poverty reduction requires larger shifts in social and 
political dynamics, such as creating many well-paying jobs through 
agro-industrialization, addressing land rights, and providing large-
scale access to health care, education, and public works.197 What is 
worrisome is that using microfinance as a paradigmatic example of 
the kind of preferred social change intervention encourages a bias 
toward business-like initiatives that favor competition, efficiency, and 
individualism.198 If enough funders believe that to “save the world” 
means adopting these particular principles, our giving may change in 
ways that lose sight of inclusiveness and equity, expression, 
institutional reform, and broad-based participation as means of 
effective social transformation.  
In fact, some philanthrocapitalists have advocated refashioning 
microfinance to more aggressively pursue profit as a dominant 
purpose in order to expand their capacity to serve more people.199 
Although surely well intentioned, this thinking demonstrates the 
                                                                                                        
195 Economist Muhammad Yunus and his Grameen Bank of Bangladesh received the 
Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 for pioneering microfinance. See Press Release, Norwegian Nobel 
Comm., The Nobel Peace Prize for 2006 (Oct. 13, 2006), available at http://nobelprize.org 
/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/press.html (“Micro-credit has proved to be an important 
liberating force in societies where women in particular have to struggle against repressive social 
and economic conditions.”). For more the origins of Grameen and microfinance, see 
MUHAMMAD YUNUS, BANKER TO THE POOR: MICRO-LENDING AND THE BATTLE AGAINST 
WORLD POVERTY (2003). 
196 EDWARDS, supra note 74, at 40. 
197 Id. 
198 See id. at 68 (“Philanthrocapitalism assumes that competition will make civil society 
more efficient and thereby bring more social change, but this is a particularly damaging form of 
social Darwinism that misreads the way social change actually occurs.”). 
199 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 116–17 (describing an argument made to a 
group of philanthropists that relying on a nonprofit model rather than a for-profit model for the 
expansion of microfinance was “a big mistake” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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extent to which the border between the nonprofit and for-profit 
sectors has become so porous that a new vision of “smart 
philanthropy” can encompass treating the poor simultaneously as 
charitable beneficiaries and as profit-generating targets ripe for 
market exchanges with the funder.200  
As commentators have long noted, charity, particularly when 
targeted at the less advantaged, sometimes does more than just 
provide aid and material support to those in need. It may also seek to 
express the values of the donor201 and/or to instill particular values in 
the individual beneficiaries of charity, such as democracy,202 
religion,203 cleanliness,204 and morality,205 among others. Here we see 
the promotion of market-based principles that have the effect of 
turning people into individual self-maximizers, rational calculators of 
costs and benefits. Law and development scholars, such as Amy 
Cohen, among others, argue that development initiatives, such as 
microfinance, advance efforts to produce new, and potentially 
neoliberal, forms of personhood.206 In a recent article, Cohen observes 
how development programs aspire to “processes of self-
transformation that produce both marked and manageable change. 
                                                                                                        
200 See Connie Bruck, Millions for Millions: This Year’s Nobel Peace Prize Winner and 
Some High-Tech Entrepreneurs Are Competing to Provide Credit to the World’s Poor, NEW 
YORKER, Oct. 30, 2006, at 62 (recounting Yunus’s reaction to the suggestion that a for-profit 
model would be preferable: “Let them [for-profit entities] make money—but why do you want 
to make money off the poor people? You make money somewhere else. Here, you come to help 
them. When they have enough flesh and blood in their bodies, go and suck them, no problem. 
But, until then, don’t do that.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
201 See PETER FRUMKIN, ON BEING NONPROFIT: A CONCEPTUAL AND POLICY PRIMER 
104–07 (2002) (discussing the role of values in the nonprofit sector); ROBERT L. PAYTON & 
MICHAEL P. MOODY, UNDERSTANDING PHILANTHROPY: ITS MEANING AND MISSION 35 (2008) 
(noting that philanthropy conveys collective values). 
202 See Jenkins, supra note 150, at 832 (arguing that public charities conducting work 
abroad convey democratic ideals to local communities). 
203 See FRUMKIN, supra note 201, at 106–07 (discussing the desire of donors to promote 
faith through charity); cf. Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the 
New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1239 (2003) (discussing the religious motives and 
influences connected to certain social welfare activities). 
204 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Locating Latinos in the Field of Civil Rights: Assessing the 
Neoliberal Case for Radical Exclusion, 83 TEX. L. REV. 489, 507–08 (2004) (book review) 
(noting that early settlement houses served as “‘Americanization’ agents, self-appointed and 
otherwise, who taught . . . American standards of cleanliness . . . and social behavior”). 
205 See, e.g., PAYTON & MOODY, supra note 201, at 111–14 (discussing philanthropy as a 
form of “moral action” and an intervention into peoples lives “that can sometimes offend or 
disturb”); see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 650 (2000) (discussing a 
nonprofit’s effort to impart “moral straightness”). 
206 See Amy J. Cohen, Thinking with Culture in Law and Development, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 
511, 570 (2009) (noting that Professor Katharine Rankin refers to these as efforts to generate 
“rational economic woman”). 
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That is, these programs would produce people who come to hold 
different values and self-understandings . . . .”207  
These insights raise important questions about how a preference 
for increased market-based philanthropy might not only reshape 
grantee organizations but also the people served by them. The 
ideology of market-based social change initiatives usually seeks to 
create individual winners within an existing economic system. 
Alternative views of philanthropy that promote social transformation 
based on, for example, instilling more communitarian or egalitarian 
values,208 may lead to different types of solutions and the promotion 
of different values. Another problem is that market-led interventions 
will likely create only small shifts in an unequal world. Without 
broader political, social, and cultural shifts, increased individual 
participation in markets is likely to reproduce existing inequalities 
rather than unsettle traditional hierarchies.209  
This is not to say that economic and market-led charitable activity 
is without merit. Quite the contrary, market-based solutions to public 
problems may work in some settings, but they are hardly a panacea. 
Social transformation also requires collective action, relationship 
building, participation, and political change. In Edwards’s view,  
[T]he world needs more civil society influence on business, 
not the other way around—more cooperation not competition, 
more collective action not individualism, and a greater 
willingness to work together to change the fundamental 
structures that keep most people poor so that all of us can live 
more fulfilling lives.210 
In addition, philanthrocapitalism may lead to an increase in profit-
motivated decision making by charitable organizations,211 thus, 
exacerbating problems related to what is known as mission creep or 
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organizational services “routinely called ‘the product,’ and its reputation referred to as ‘the 
franchise’”). 
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mission drift.212 While nonprofits, of course, need to be mindful of 
responsible fiscal management and stewardship, their constant search 
for additional resources can obfuscate key priorities, causing them to 
emphasize more profitable activities at the expense of other more 
traditional, but perhaps less lucrative, activities.  
Challenges faced by university presses illustrate this trend. For 
decades the university press was considered a core aspect of the 
intellectual mission and contribution of great research universities, 
but in recent years, university boards and presidents have redefined 
their academic mission to exclude publishing quality scholarship.213 
In fact, often viewed as “too costly” or an “economic drain[],” 
university presses have been severely cut back214 or shuttered 
altogether.215 Of course, research universities, like all nonprofits, 
often need to make difficult financial decisions. However, what is 
interesting about this recent shift regarding higher education’s view of 
the worthiness of knowledge—a social good that private markets do 
not necessarily sustain216—is how the publication of research is so 
easily analogized to a business, with its survival based on commercial 
profitability, rather than excellence or scholarly contributions.217 The 
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CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 26, 2010, at A13 (discussing the closure of Eastern Washington 
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Persist, Insiders Agree, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 9, 2004, at A20 (noting the closure of both 
the Northeastern University Press and the University of Idaho Press); Michael E. Young & 
Steven R. Thompson, SMU Press Suspending Its Operations, DALL. MORNING NEWS, May 6, 
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subsequent move then has been for some academic leaders to dismiss 
the dissemination of research as falling outside the academic core.218 
This example demonstrates how the introduction of business values 
can have subtle effects on the work of institutions in potentially 
undesirable ways.219  
To be clear, philanthrocapitalism is not the sole cause of nonprofit 
mission drift, nor is it responsible for nonprofit entities engaging in 
cost-benefit calculations.220 Indeed, I fully recognize that nonprofits 
have always balanced ideals with financial realities. For example, 
certain nonprofits, particularly universities, have long charged fees, 
which serve to limit access to their services. The real concern, 
however, is that the principles of philanthrocapitalism may push tax-
exempt organizations to substitute mission-related goals with a profit 
motive. In this respect, philanthrocapitalism advances the long-
observed trend toward commercialization in the nonprofit sector. 
When profit seeking becomes a foundation-approved guiding 
principle, then it becomes much easier for the profit motive to guide 
decision making instead of social utility. 
Moreover, philanthrocapitalism, with its emphasis on measuring 
success in terms of quantifiable outcomes, may limit the space for 
participatory, bottom-up problem solving, which is intrinsically 
valuable.221 If we consider, for example, the earlier hypothetical 
foundation working on elementary- and secondary-school reform 
through support of charter schools discussed in section III.A.1,222 we 
recall that the school’s emphasis on metrics at the behest of the 
foundation is an attempt to create accountability. But it may instead 
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create an accountability shift. Rather than being accountable to 
parents, the community, teachers, and students, schools that are 
obsessively focused on test results can be said to become 
“accountable” to an unregulated testing industry. A recent study on 
the impact of performance measurement on grantor-grantee 
relationships determined that “a funder’s focus on short-term 
quantifiable results can stifle grantee learning and steer attention 
away from the concerns of other important stakeholders, particularly 
beneficiaries.”223  
The desire to incorporate a business perspective into philanthropy 
also may influence organizational governance. A wide range of 
nonprofit boards of directors, who are largely made up of elites and 
individuals with corporate backgrounds, are increasingly selecting 
individuals with significant private-sector experience when they make 
important personnel decisions. In 2011, two of the three largest U.S. 
private foundations were headed by chief executive officers drawn 
from the corporate sector without prior extensive professional work 
experience with either government or nonprofits.224 My research 
indicates that this is the first time in at least half a century that 
executives who spent the bulk of their careers in the for-profit sector 
have so dominated the top echelons of philanthropic foundation 
posts.225 Of course, these anecdotal observations are too small in 
number to draw definitive conclusions, but they help illustrate the 
sector’s increasing interest, not just in transferring corporate 
management skills to the nonprofit sector, but also in bringing in 
corporate management experience through their hiring, a trend which 
may be connected to the rhetoric and principles associated with 
philanthrocapitalism. It may be too soon to determine what results 
will be achieved by business-managers-turned-foundation-CEOs. If it 
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turns out like other experiments with business leaders transitioning to 
public office, however, then the results will likely be mixed.226  
More than just a buzzword, philanthrocapitalism presupposes 
certain values that may not be fully understood, especially to the 
extent the term becomes conflated with “strategic” or “effective” 
grantmaking. Accepting its tenets without critical examination may 
turn the practice of philanthropy in new directions and generate 
unintended side effects for charitable organizations. 
C. Changing Individual and Government Giving 
As discussed previously, philanthrocapitalism focuses on the 
power of business elites actively using their corporate skills and 
vocabulary to engage in “high performance” philanthropy.227 The 
rhetoric of philanthrocapitalism centers on the activity of the 
superwealthy. This emphasis carries a risk that the goal of increased 
giving by some could supplant the also-important goal of increasing 
giving by a wider cross section of ordinary individuals or 
governments. Fueled by the prospects of big results, the rhetoric of 
the philanthrocapitalism movement positions “effective giving” as 
something that ordinary individual donors who lack serious wealth 
cannot mimic in size, scope, or style. Thus, the more typical 
individual donors may feel left out of this new vision of effectiveness 
and possibly become disinclined to give or to donate less than they 
otherwise might.228 
One core message of philanthrocapitalism is that smart 
philanthropy is too difficult for those who have not been vetted by the 
rough-and-tumble world of the stock exchange. However, once 
“smart” or “strategic” philanthropy is seen as requiring an M.B.A. 
degree, proven business acumen, donations large enough to allow the 
donor to call the shots, and direct access to world leaders, it calls into 
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question the value of the philanthropy conducted by the average 
donor. Despite the image projected by philanthrocapitalism, most 
charitable giving in 2009 was not from billionaire-funded private 
foundations or large corporate enterprises. Instead, the largest portion 
of total private giving to nonprofit organizations in 2009—eighty-
three percent—was contributed by individuals through direct giving 
and charitable bequests.229 In contrast, foundations and corporations 
combined gave seventeen percent.230 These figures illustrate the 
importance of individual giving in philanthropy.231 With so much 
support coming from individuals, the nonprofit sector has a stake in 
assuring that the culture of giving remains inclusive. In a recent book 
explaining one reason why people do not donate more to important 
charitable causes, Princeton University ethicist Peter Singer points to 
a sense of futility and a diffusion of responsibility that contributes to a 
belief that others will take care of a problem.232 The rhetoric of 
philanthrocapitalism compounds this phenomenon. This is 
particularly problematic for Singer and others who argue for a 
significant increase in giving by ordinary individuals targeted at 
global development and relief efforts as the best means to end 
extreme global poverty.233 The professionalization of the nonprofit 
sector should not dampen the desire of those who are not extremely 
wealthy from engaging in meaningful philanthropy. 
Messages about effectiveness that may discourage individual 
giving are undesirable not simply because of the potential lost 
revenue to the charitable sector, but because charitable giving 
provides an important means of expression and associational 
affiliation that binds civil society. Nonprofit engagement serves a 
critical role by providing civic glue that holds the social fabric 
together, contributing to social capital, and strengthening public 
life.234 Personal giving by individuals reflects human compassion, 
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deepens ties between individuals and organizations, connects people 
to other citizens, permits a means for one to lend direct support for 
concrete action, facilitates civic and political engagement, and instills 
democratic values. Accordingly, it is the work of all citizens, not just 
the province of the superrich. Broad-based individual giving 
engenders a sense of mutual dependence and shared values that build 
connections among the people in a democracy.235 
In addition to impacting ordinary individuals, we must also 
consider the effect of philanthrocapitalism and its rhetoric on the role 
of governments in social problem solving. Because the movement 
emphasizes wealthy private citizens as those most able to “save the 
world,” the state is distanced from solutions and positioned as an 
unnecessary bureaucratic link. In many respects, philanthrocapitalism 
is linked to three decades of neoliberal policies that have sought to 
privatize social welfare.236 It teaches people that corporations and 
compassionate and powerful individuals will care for societal 
problems, presumably obviating the need for government regulation, 
liberal welfare policies, progressive taxation, and the like. As a result, 
the lure of philanthrocapitalism may further limit our imagination or 
political will to engage in collective, broad-based, bottom-up social 
transformation. 
As the philanthrocapitalism model has spread, by positioning itself 
as the model for effective grantmaking, it has also influenced 
government-funding processes. Both local and federal governments 
are beginning to mirror the muscular practices of the new 
philanthropists. For example, in New York City, a senior policy 
official writes that the city government has “taken dramatic steps to 
. . . demand measurable results from [supported nonprofits].”237 The 
language of the statement acknowledges that the state’s interactions 
with grantee nonprofits have changed in significant ways and conveys 
a mindset about the relationship: that the state makes demands and 
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expects the nonprofits to follow. Moreover, the city government has 
explicitly “adopted the strategic philanthropy model of investment 
familiar to the corporate and foundation worlds.”238  
At the federal level, a newly created Social Innovation Fund Pilot 
Program (SIF) serves as an example of strategic philanthropy 
principles being incorporated into government-funding processes 
from Washington, D.C. Created by the Edward M. Kennedy Serve 
America Act of 2009 and administered by the Corporation for 
National and Community Service (CNCS),239 the SIF supports 
nonprofit organizations working in underserved neighborhoods and 
communities on various issue areas.240 For five years, beginning in 
2010 with a $50 million allocation and through 2014 when the 
allocation grows to $100 million,241 the SIF is authorized to make 
grants ranging from $1 million to $10 million each to intermediary 
organizations.242 The intermediary grantees will then make subgrants 
to nonprofit organizations, in amounts not less than $100,000.243 The 
program requires matching funds of two nonfederal dollars for every 
SIF dollar given: one dollar matched by the intermediary and one 
raised by the local recipient grantee of the intermediary.244  
In many respects, several of the statutory requirements and plans 
to administer the SIF seem to be taken right out of the 
philanthrocapitalism playbook: leveraging other funders (through the 
matching grants ultimately turning the federal government’s $50 
million into $200 million), emphasizing data measurement and 
results-oriented outcomes, using business/philanthrocapitalism jargon 
(e.g., “investments,” “leveraging capital,” “measurable outcomes,” 
“social entrepreneurs”), favoring replication and expansion of 
established programs, and preferring “hands on” engagement by the 
intermediary.245 Even prior to its completion of the review of grant 
applications, CNCS publicly announced its intention to concentrate 
the SIF funding on larger grants at the high end of its discretion in the 
$5 to $10 million range, thus favoring a smaller number of grantees 
receiving larger dollar amounts;246 the program chose to divide the 
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inaugural funding among just eleven recipients.247 Taken together, 
these examples suggest that the reach of philanthrocapitalism 
principles has affected grantmaking practices far beyond the activities 
of just a few very large foundations, and that government is now an 
active participant in the new philanthropy as well. 
Finally, there is concern that philanthrocapitalism and other forms 
of muscular philanthropy may divert attention from and participation 
in community-based philanthropy. The danger is that “the rich will 
save us” arguments may generate an apathy that undermines 
grassroots philanthropy, which seeks to involve communities in 
solving their own problems. Without the full engagement of 
communities and multiple parties in society working together to forge 
new social arrangements, our solutions are more likely to be tinkering 
around the edges rather than systematic reforms, which usually 
require greater involvement of and support from multiple 
constituencies. To a large extent, the contributions of nonprofits to 
civil society are not just valued for their achievement or end results, 
but also because nonprofits are organizations by and for the people, 
creating binding ties and relationships. In other words, in nonprofit 
work, the means are just as important as the ends.248 Peter Singer has 
reminded us that we may applaud the generosity of Gates and Buffett, 
but still be uneasy with a brand of philanthropy that places the fates of 
so many in the hands of so few.249 Both foundations and their 
nonprofit partners should not lose sight of the fact that there is no 
monopoly on creative public problem solving and experimentation in 
the social sector, and that philanthropy can only become dangerously 
insular and elitist if it confuses wealth with wisdom. 
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D. Undermining Democratic Values 
The goals and spirit embedded in a particular philosophy of 
philanthropy inevitably will shape its practices and attitudes. It is not 
surprising that a philanthropic system based on market principles 
would favor solutions grounded in competition and individualism, 
whereas one based on communitarian principles would emphasize 
solutions grounded in cooperation and collective action. The rhetoric 
and philosophy of philanthrocapitalism thus implicate democratic 
values and philanthropic values, which in turn may impact the types 
of projects more likely to receive funding. 
Over the past decade, academics have focused their attention on 
the pervasive pattern of outsourcing and privatization by which core 
government functions are being transferred to private contractors.250 
Prominent law professors, including Laura Dickinson, Jody Freeman, 
and Martha Minow, have raised important questions about the 
commitment to democratic values, accountability, and public 
participation associated with this emergent form of governance 
through private contract.251 Out of their work has come a push to 
ensure that those important public values do not become divorced 
from vital functions. They stress that in cases when outsourcing may 
be appropriate, essential democratic norms should travel with the 
work, regardless of the service provider. Scholars are increasingly 
recognizing the hybridization of public and private functions in the 
government and for-profit contexts.252 Similarly, in the philanthropic 
setting, I argue that as private foundations take on public issues in 
their role as active participants in civil society governance, the way in 
which they conduct their activities holds the potential either to 
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advance or erode fundamental public values. The more ambitious 
philanthrocapitalists, in particular, are undertaking projects focused 
on addressing global poverty, education, terrorism, environmental 
issues,253 and democracy,254 all deeply associated with matters we 
might think of as governmental. Accordingly, their work should be 
critically examined to ensure that public values also travel with them 
as they claim the mantle of superior public issue problem solvers on 
behalf of society. 
The largest concern is that philanthrocapitalism as a model for 
philanthropy may be unhealthy for democracy. Professor Evelyn 
Brody has acknowledged the conflicted relationship between private 
philanthropy and democratic values.  
Democracies feel ambivalent about private philanthropy: 
‘We expect rich men to be generous with their wealth and 
criticize them when they are not; but when they make 
benefaction, we question their motives, deplore the methods 
by which they obtained their abundance, and wonder 
whether their gifts will not do more harm than good.’255  
Brody and the Filer Commission are acknowledging deep-seated 
concerns for democracy when rich elites make philanthropic 
decisions affecting large segments of the polity. This concern 
becomes especially meaningful if we value the work of the nonprofit 
sector not simply for what results it achieves (as the 
philanthrocapitalists so often do), but for its potential to inculcate 
democratic practices of self-government and serve as a mediating 
space between markets and government.256 As private foundations 
“help[] to meet public needs[,] . . . respond[] to human problems, 
shap[e] the moral agenda, and express[] cultural values” through their 
work, they assume “a vital role in maintaining (and reforming) . . . 
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democra[tic society].”257 This deep connection between philanthropy 
and democracy is important because changes in one sphere potentially 
influence the other. As philanthropic studies scholars Robert Payton 
and Michael Moody argue, “Democracy needs philanthropy because 
democracy is not simply a political phenomenon; it is a cultural one 
as well. Many of the values that uphold the culture of democracy are 
fostered not in government or in the marketplace but in 
philanthropy.”258 Through both the content and the process of their 
giving, foundations contribute to democratic governance by directing 
resources to selected people, ideas, and programs and by facilitating 
the practices of self-government with public charity partners. As 
grant-seeking charities compete for funding, they develop projects 
that engage and ultimately aggregate the individual voices, opinions 
and perspectives of various organizational stakeholders (i.e., staff, 
board members, volunteers, members, and community members 
served by the entity). Thus viewing philanthropy as an ally of 
representative democracy makes philanthrocapitalism all the more 
worrisome. To the extent that private foundations treat grantees as 
subcontractors and dominate public charities, they undercut 
opportunities for foundation giving to support civic participation and 
broad-based involvement in a dynamic and diverse civil society.      
By its very terms, the philanthrocapitalism project advances the 
concentration of power and influence in the hands of small numbers 
of the wealthiest Americans: an elite set of philanthrocapitalists 
relying on their personal views and business experience to select 
social solutions for the rest of society. But if they are to “save the 
world,” the preferences of philanthrocapitalists must match the needs 
and desires of the broader global society. From this perspective, the 
idea that the superwealthy should maintain a strong directive hand in 
controlling the nonprofit sector’s resources and approaches to 
problem solving looks self-serving and suspect. For example, some of 
our most pressing social problems—environmental justice, human 
rights, healthcare, to name a few—lie in highly contested areas where 
people hold differing perspectives on the underlying assumptions, 
root causes, and solutions, divisions which often pit business interests 
against other social goals. Those whose careers have been steeped in 
business and who have deep ties to corporate America are likely to 
hold views colored by their experiences and interests.259 Furthermore, 
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the social, cultural, and economic experiences of the superwealthy 
often are not representative of that of the broader citizenry, which 
may also influence their view on social problem solving. For example 
in 2009, in the midst of a severe U.S. economic downturn, the 
average income of the top five percent of all earners increased, while 
the remaining ninety-five percent of citizens saw a decrease in 
income.260 Relying on muscular philanthropy to address these divisive 
problems thus threatens to paper over social conflict and to mistake 
the foundation’s perspective for social consensus. A major tenet of 
democracy is that a variety of independent and representative parties 
should be involved for effective problem solving around 
transformative social problems, including poverty, justice, bigotry, 
international conflict, education, and ethical transparency. Such 
responsibility cannot be turned over to an unelected class of corporate 
chieftains (even well-intentioned ones) no matter how grateful we 
may be for their generosity.  
Moreover, with its emphasis on superrich hyperagents solving 
social problems,261 philanthrocapitalism amplifies the voice of those 
who already wield substantial influence, access, and power.262 This 
reality lies in sharp contrast to the traditional role of nonprofit 
organizations, which have often provided a means for voices and 
views that might otherwise go unheard to be expressed and become 
part of the public conversation.263 Instead, the philanthrocapitalism 
movement, with its emphasis on the funder, turns that view on its 
head and strengthens the voices of the powerful. Not surprisingly, 
philanthrocapitalists seem to fully recognize their power base and 
embrace the enhanced status and influence to be garnered from their 
muscular philanthropy. An explicit strategy of philanthrocapitalists is 
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to seek the ultimate leverage of philanthropic giving by influencing 
government to follow their lead in choosing what social initiatives 
(both problems and preferred solutions) are worthy of support.264 
Traditionally, prominent private foundations have sought similar 
influence by viewing themselves as providers of seed funding or 
seeking to demonstrate the success of programs and initiatives that 
government will be inspired to expand.265 The philanthrocapitalism 
movement, however, has taken these modest notions to new levels.266 
Diane Ravitch, a prominent historian of education, writing about 
the new guard of philanthropists (which she calls “the Billionaire 
Boys Club”), states: 
We have never in the history of the United States had 
foundations with the wealth of the Gates Foundation and 
some of the other billionaire foundations—the Walton Family 
Foundation, The Broad Foundation. And these three 
foundations—Gates, Broad and Walton—are committed now 
to charter schools and to evaluating teachers by test scores. 
And that’s now the policy of the U.S. Department of 
Education. We have never seen anything like this, where 
foundations had the ambition to direct national educational 
policy, and in fact are succeeding.267  
To mention another recent example: a consortium of four family 
foundations controlled by philanthrocapitalists jointly informed the 
District of Columbia government that they would withdraw $64.5 
million in funding if a named individual ceased to serve as the city’s 
schools chancellor.268 Although such employment provisions—often 
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referred to as “key-man provisions” in corporate deals, which 
condition performance on the continued employment of certain 
designated personnel—may be commonplace in certain high-level 
business agreements, the use of this tool of the business world by 
nonprofit entities dealing with a local government is alien to 
democratic values. It is striking that the four foundations, formed by a 
hedge-fund manager,269 a former hedge-fund manager,270 a retail 
heir,271 and an insurance industry entrepreneur,272 based in locations 
far from D.C.,273 have intentionally sought to use the power of their 
substantial giving to influence local-government personnel decisions. 
According to press reports at the time this provision came to light, the 
leading mayoral candidates—the position responsible for appointing 
the schools chancellor—held divergent views about whether to retain 
the incumbent chancellor. The foundations’ actions could be viewed 
as a calculated attempt to either pressure the political candidates into 
taking a specific position on an important public-policy matter or as a 
veiled attempt to influence the voting public274 likely to benefit from 
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the substantial grant dollars directed to their community, a third of 
which had been earmarked for teacher pay raises negotiated between 
the union and the jurisdiction.275 In this instance, however, the voters 
did not re-elect the incumbent mayor who supported the school 
system chancellor. As a result, the foundation-supported public 
official resigned and the grant dollars are at risk. Regardless of the 
outcome or the actual motives of the foundations, we should be 
concerned when private individuals use philanthropy to exert pressure 
on significant public matters, especially when they use private 
foundations, which are separate legal entities organized for public 
benefit. Yet many philanthrocapitalists are determining that “one of 
the most effective ways to leverage their money . . . is to use it to 
shape how political power is exercised.”276 As such, models of 
philanthropy and actions like this are extolled as effective and 
strategic grantmaking, we are likely to see increases in such troubling 
behavior, slowly chipping away at important democratic values. 
CONCLUSION 
Philanthrocapitalism is purposefully ambitious. In this Article, I 
argue that this emerging model has already proved itself powerful; its 
potential to spread and become, as its proponents envision, a 
“revolution”277 makes it worthy of consideration and debate among 
scholars and lawyers. Calls for the increased accountability of private 
foundations have created a climate in which philanthrocapitalism has 
gained currency. Accountability “law talk,” combined with the rise of 
the philanthrocapitalism model, has already begun to affect the ways 
in which philanthropy is conducted. Other foundations, even those 
without a billionaire benefactor, are adapting the techniques of 
philanthrocapitalism in an attempt to mimic the state-of-the-art 
practices of the “strategic” givers. Remember philanthrocapitalism 
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aims to reach beyond the small world of wealthy grantmaking 
foundations—ultimately it seeks to change wide swaths of nonprofit 
institutions (both foundations and grant-receiving public charities) 
and even to influence government spending and decision making. 
The goal of this Article is to interject a note of caution and balance 
the overly optimistic views of philanthrocapitalism that have 
accompanied its rise. Like supporters of philanthrocapitalism, I hope 
that the superwealthy will continue to donate to nonprofit 
organizations or form private foundations. I want them, however, to 
do so in ways that promote strong civil society, strengthen nonprofit 
institutions, and respect and listen to the voices of communities in 
need. Results and impact are important, but so are values such as 
participation, empowerment, democracy, relationship building, and 
community building. In the end, I doubt that analogizing charitable 
work to that of capitalist entrepreneurs and Wall Street investors will 
enrich the way nonprofits are governed and the way they carry out 
their activities—particularly to the extent that nonprofit work 
disproportionately affects non-elites in society, i.e., poor, 
disadvantaged, and middle-class people. Instead, the growth of 
philanthrocapitalism threatens to erode the fragile but significant 
partnership that has evolved between public charities and private 
foundations, a partnership that respects the expertise and 
contributions of both entities. Muscular philanthropy reduces notions 
of effective grantmaking to grand-knowing and taskmastering.  Such 
a perspective reveals a basic misperception about the way nonprofits 
succeed in addressing social challenges. 
We should not permit our excitement about new financial 
resources to blind ourselves to the strings that may be attached to the 
new money, strings that may diminish the creative work of public 
charities, undermine important philanthropic values, and discourage 
individual donors and governments from giving. This is not a debate 
that lawyers and other advocates for the nonprofit sector can afford to 
sit out or ignore. 
